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According to Kierkegaard, the knowledge of God begins with the
recognition of various truths about oneself.

Every individual, just by

virtue of being human, has the capacity to develop an intuitive awareness
of God.

In this thesis, I explore the nature of this knowledge.

In

chapter one, I introduce a number of ideas important for understanding
Kierkegaard's phenomenology of religious belief, including his distinction
between objective and subjective reflection, his method (indirect
communication), and his psychology.

The first chapter concludes with a

description of the range or domain of "natural religion."

In the next

chapter, I analyze the structural or formative elements of natural
religion, the awakening of a God-relationship in the extremity of selfknowledge (an individual's awareness of the eternal, infinite, and
possible aspects of the human "self").

In the final chapter, I explore

two related peculiarities in Kierkegaard's treatment of religious
knowledge:

his contempt for inductive or probabilistic arguments, and his

suggestion that the existence of God can become clear to a person with a
different kind of certainty.

I argue that although he overstates his

polemic against theistic arguments, Kierkegaard is nonetheless correct in
his account of the proper ground of belief in God.

I conclude by

juxtaposing Kierkegaard's views on belief in God with those of twentieth
century probabilistic theologians and atheologians, as well as the
"Reformed Epistemology" of Alvin Plantinga.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

For Aristotle, philosophy begins with wonder and culminates in a
systematic understanding of the principles that underlie the universe.

So

conceived, the philosopher's task is to ask the question, "What can I
know?"

Soren Kierkegaard is a philosopher of another cast.

is of a different sort.

His question

"What I really lack," he writes in his Journals,

is to be clear in my mind what I am to do, not what I am to know,
except in so far as a certain understanding must precede every
action
The thing is to understand myself, to see what God really
wishes me to do; the thing is to find a truth which is true for me,
to find the idea for which I can live and die. .
. I certainly do
not deny that I still recognize an imperative of understanding and
that through it one can work upon men, but it must be taken up into
my life, and that is what I now recognize as the most important
thing.'
Descartes begins with the self, with his cogito ergo sum ("I think,
therefore I exist"), and reasons his way out (at an alarming rate) to a
scientific understanding of the cosmos.

Kierkegaard begins with the self,

which he conceives as a relation or synthesis of various and opposing
tendencies coupled with the self's awareness of the relation, and gazes
inward, exploring what it is to be a person, and more importantly, how to
get on with the task of existing as a person.

1Soren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, 7 vols., trans. Howard V.
Hong and Edna H. Hong (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press,
1967-78), 5.34-35.
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Kierkegaard distinguishes between two types of knowledge, or two ways
of knowing.

Some of our knowledge is abstract, speculative, or

scientific; other is experiential, affective, or connatural.

A number of

other philosophers, including Pascal and William James, make a similar
distinction.

Aquinas employs it in his analysis of the virtues.'

One can

know, for instance, what chastity is by studying "moral science."
Alternatively, one can know what chastity is by habituation- -by
chaste.

being

In the case of the virtues, habituation is arguably a more

appropriate way of knowing, and results in a far richer and more complete
knowledge of particular virtues.

Kierkegaard describes these two ways of

knowing as "objective" and "subjective" respectively.
distinction to both moral and religious knowledge.

He applies the

One can know various

truths about God through disinterested, objective inquiry.

But the best

way to know God is to engage in another kind of reflection, one that
involves the whole person, not just the intellect.
Furthermore, according to Kierkegaard, the knowledge of God begins
with the recognition of various truths about oneself.

Hence, every

individual, in so far as he is human, has the capacity to develop an
intuitive awareness of God.

The nature of this knowledge, its sources and

its limitations, I explore in what follows.

In this chapter. I introduce

a number of Ideas important for understanding Kierkegaard's treatment of
religious knowledge, including his distinction between objective and
subjective reflection, his method (indirect communication), and his
psychology.

I conclude with a description of the range or domain of

1George Stengren, "Connatural Knowledge in Aquinas and Kierkegaardian
Subjectivity," in Kierkegaardiana X, p. 183.
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"natural" religion --the knowledge of Cod that every individual has the
capacity to develop just by virtue of being human.

These preliminaries

aside, chapter two contains a critical analysis of the structural or
formative elements of natural religion, in particular its genesis in the
extremity of self-knowledge --the individual's awareness of the eternal.
infinite, and possible aspects of the human person.

Finally, in chapter

three I discuss two related oddities in Kierkegaard's treatment of
religious knowledge:

his contempt for inductive or probabilistic

arguments, and his suggestion that the existence of God can become clear
to a person with a certainty that is unique.

These aspects of his thought

set up some interesting contrasts with contemporary philosophers of
religion, with which I conclude.

Passion
"The present age," Kierkegaard said of the nineteenth century, "is
essentially a sensible, reflecting age, devoid of passion, flaring up in
superficial, short lived enthusiasm and prudentially relaxing in
indolence."1
enthusiasm.

"Passion" here does not signify strong or violent emotion or
Rather, it signifies a deep and abiding concern, earnestness,

or interestedness.

Passions issue forth from the core of an individual's

personality and provide focus and direction for the whole of a person's
life.

Thinking about human existence, insists Kierkegaard, requires

passion:
To think about existential problems in such a way as to leave out the
passion, is tantamount to not thinking about them at all, since it is

lIdem, Two Ages, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 68

to forget the point, which is that the thinker is himself an existing
individual. 1
Passion connotes personal involvement in one's reflections as an exister.
Kierkegaard resists what he calls the "objective ter

ncy," the

tendency to intellectualize life without regard for one's own existence.
The problem with nineteenth century thinking about human existence,
manifested in "a sense of despair over being human,"2 was not so much a
lack of understanding and reflection as it was a surfeit of understanding
and reflection coupled with an utter lack of passion.

"The individual"

had been engulfed in "the System" (Kierkegaard's term for the
philosophical tradition inspired by Hegel).

The objective tendency makes

people into observers--mere spectators rather than active, responsible
participants in life.

To compensate for an overdose of objectivity with

respect to life's most important questions, Kierkegaard prescribes an
intensification of passion.

The Subjective Thinker
Kierkegaard drew a now famous and often misconstrued distinction
between objective and subjective reflection.

To reflect objectively about

something is to adopt an attitude of neutrality or disinterestedness
toward it.

Objective reflection is essentially dispassionate.

often considered the paradigm of objective reflection.

Science is

The physicist

investigating the structure of the atom does not (at least not ideally)
allow her personal hopes, wishes, feelings, or aspirations to influence

lIdem [Johannes Climacusl, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans.
David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1941), p. 313.
2Ibid., p. 317.
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her analysis of the empirical "facts."

The psychologist or sociologist,

to the extent that she is a scientist, is expected to reach conclusions
about human behavior without interference from her personal desires,
emotions, or values, in short, whatever belongs to subjectivity.

In each

case, the subjective element is considered distortive and a hindrance to
discovering the truth about reality.

In objective reflection, thought is

directed to something external to the individual, and hence, "thought must
be pointed away from the subject."1
Subjective reflection, on the other hand, seeks to relate thought to
the reflecting individual's own concrete existence --it "accentuates
existence."2

In subjective reflection, attention is focused inward on the

individual's relationship to the thought content.

The aim of subjective

reflection is to appropriate or realize a given thought in one's own life.
Personal appropriation is the most important element in reflections on
human existence.

Against the speculative philosophers of his day,

Kierkegaard complained that their systems of thought were like huge barns
which, once complete, they abandoned to live in an adjacent cottage.
One's thought, urges Kierkegaard, should be a dwelling in which one
faithfully abides.

The task is not simply to know the truth in some

detached intellectual sense.

From the standpoint of subjective

reflection, the important question
is whether a person will in the deepest sense acknowledge the truth,
will allow it to penetrate his whole being, will accept all its

lIbid., p. 171.
2Ibid., p. 173.
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consequences, and not have an emer&ency hiding place for himself and
a Judas kiss for the consequences.'
As he puts it elsewhere, to think is one thing; but "to exist in what has
been thought" is something else altogether.2
Against attempts to "mediate" the two types of reflection by remaking
the individual in the form of a "subject -object [sic]," Kierkegaard
reminds us that "the fact that [the individual] exists is precisely what
will make it impossible for him to proceed along both ways at once."3
do so would be tantamount to being in two places at one time.

To

A woman

facing a pregnancy cannot decide for or against an abortion by a
disinterested analysis of the facts, themselves ambiguous and uncertain.
Yet she must choose.
cannot remain neutral.

The decision affects here entire existence and she
The question she asks is, "What am I to do?"

All

of us face similar situations in which a decision is forced in the absence
of a firm knowledge of its implications and without the benefit of
decisive objective considerations.

The key difference, then, between

objective and subjective reflection lies in "the relationship sustained by
the existing individual, in his own existence, to the content of his
utterance. n4
The contrast between objective and subjective reflection is
fundamental in Kierkegaard's thought, and is reflected in other

lldem
Haufniensisl, The Concept of Anxiety, trans. Reider
Thomte and Albert B. Anderson (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1980), p. 138.
2Idem [Johannes Climacus], Postscript
3Ibid., p. 172.
4Ibid., p. 181.

p. 228.
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distinctions throughout his works.

For instance, in the Concluding

Unscientific Postscript, he distinguishes between "abstract" and
"concrete" thought.

Abstract thought is "thought without a thinker."

It

abstracts from existence, and "ignores everything except the thought."
Since "existence is always something particular, the abstract does not
exist." (Italics mine.)
abstract thought.1

Existence is, as it were, a "foreign medium" to

Questions about what exists cannot be addressed in the

language of abstraction.

Concrete thought, on the other hand, "is thought

in relation to a thinker."2
particular place and time.

Concrete thought always pertains to a
A person's understanding is "concrete" in so

far as its content is concrete, and "the most concrete content that
consciousness can have is consciousness of itself, of the individual
himself."3
The distinction between "aesthetic pathos" and "existential pathos"
also reflects the contrast between objective and subjective reflection.
Aesthetic pathos is not concerned with actual (concrete) existence.

It is

like the pathos of the poet for whom reality is a mere occasion, a point
of departure from which she imagines some ideal in comparison with which
reality is but a feeble reflection.

Aesthetic pathos distances the

individual from the pressures of existence.

Existential pathos, on the

other hand, is expressed whenever an idea "is brought into relation with
the existence of the individual so as to transform it."

The end of

lIbid., p. 296.
21bid.
3Idem [Vigilius Haufniensis]
, The Concept of Anxiety, p. 143.
4

Idem [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, p. 347.

8
existential pathos is the appropriation of the thought content.

It is

expressed in action--"the reconstruction of the individual's mode
of
existence."'
Furthermore, the transition from knowing some objective fact to
appropriating it in one's life is not direct, following more or less
automatically as a matter of course.

To think otherwise, says

Kierkegaard, is either an "illusion" based on an individual's ignorance
of
the decisively subjective character of the decision to act, or an
"evasion" of a personal decision, perhaps disguised as an objective
approach to the matter.2

One can be positively clear on the objective

facts pertaining to some momentous issue confronting one's life, and
still
not come to a personal decision.

One can still avoid the appropriation

process that constitutes subjective acceptance of a given existential
possibility.

To borrow one of his examples, "to understand what

Christianity is, is not the difficulty, but to become and to be a
Christian."3

One can know what Christianity is without being a Christian.

But it is impossible to know what it is to be a Christian without actuall
y
becoming one.
Kierkegaard claims that subjective reflection yields the "most truth"
or the "greater certainty" about human existence.

With respect to

"essential truth" he denies the possibility of pure objectivity and
apodictic certainty of the sort appropriate to mathematics.

Essential

truth is truth as it pertains to existence, in particular human existence.

'Ibid.. p. 386.
2Ibid., p. 115-116.
3Ibid., p. 497.
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Moreover, only "truths which can be appropriated by the subject and in
which appropriation plays an essential part" are essential truths.'
Knowledge has a relationship to the knower, who is essentially an
existing individual, and .
for this reason all essential
knowledge is essentially related to existence. [Furthermore,1 only
ethico-religious knowledge has an essential relationship to the
existence of the knower.'
Thus, to suggest that essential truth is a matter of appropriation or
subjectivity emphasizes that it bears an essential relation to the
exigencies of human existence.

With regard to the truth as it pertains to

existence (moral and religious truth), objective reflection trades in
probabilities --unending approximations that never arrive at the final
truth.

Since the seeker of essential truth "stresses precisely the fact

that he is an existing individual, then one of the . . . two ways which
especially accentuates existence [that is, subjective reflection] would
seem to be especially worthy of commendation."3

Thus, with regard to the

most important questions of life, the truth for the individual "consists
in nothing else than the self-activity of personal appropriation."4
Kierkegaard's notion of subjectivity does not to preclude a concern
for objective truth.
relativism.

Nor does it open the door to epistemological

On the contrary, Kierkegaard believes that a concern for

objective, non-relativistic truth is a manifestation of true subjectivity.
The truth is universally valid, even if it is not universally

1Gregor Malantshuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, ed. and trans. Howard V.
Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 284.
2Kierkegaard [Johannes Climacus],
Postscript, p. 177.
31bid., p. 173.
p. 217.
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recognizable.
claims.

What he challenges is a certain attitude toward truth

He is critical of objective reflection when construed as a route

to essential truth.

The objective path presupposes that the truth can be

ascertained apart from any subjective commitment or appropriation on the
part of the truth seeker.

Sometimes, of course, this assumption is

Kierkegaard's point seems to be that, at least in some areas

legitimate.

of knowledge, "the objective truth is a product of subjective
commitment."1
Precisely as important as the truth, and if one of the two is to be
emphasized, still more important, is the manner in which the truth is
accepted.2
Essential truth is disclosed in and through the process of existing
itself. Given the right sort of subjectivity (the sort that contributes to
personal growth), what a person believes on the basis of subjective
reflection will be the objective truth.
There are, explains Kierkegaard. two ways to be related to the truth,
corresponding to whether the truth is considered from an objective or a
subjective standpoint:
When the question of truth is raised in an objective manner,
reflection is directed objectively to the truth, as an object to
which the knower is related
Reflection is not focussed [sicl upon
the relationship, however, but upon the question of whether it is the
truth to which the knower is related. If only the object to which he
is related is the truth the subject is accounted to be in the truth.
When the question is directed subjectively to the nature of the
individual's relationship; if only the mode of this relationship is
in the truth, the individual is in the truth even if he should happen
to be thus related to what is not true.3

IC. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript'
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983), p. 129.
-KierKegaard [Johannes Climacus], Postscript
p. 178.

p. 221.
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The "mode" of the relationship is the realm of action.

To be "in the

truth" in the second of the above two senses (in which the truth is
considered subjectively) is to have one's existence transformed in the
appropriate way--to perform true actions.

Hence, it is possibl- to live

the truth (that is, for one's life to be true) even if one's beliefs
are
objectively false
sphere.

The clearest instances of this occur in the moral

For example, in book ten of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle

suggests that Eudoxus's arguments for hedonism were convincing becaus
e of
his virtuous character, not because of the strengths of the argument
themselves (which, according to Aristotle, were mistaken).

Eudoxus was

"in the truth" from a subjective standpoint on the basis of his life,
even
though his ideas about morality were objectively false.

His character was

more of an "argument" than his arguments.
Kierkegaard says similar things about Socrates.

Socrates offered no

proofs of his own of immortality (though he considers several in the
Phaedo).

But "with the passion of the infinite [he] so determined the

pattern of his life that it must be found acceptable --if there is an
immortality."

He lived his life in conformity with an idea that was, from

an objective standpoint, an uncertainty.

"Is any better proof capable of

being given," asks Kierke6dard, "for the immortality of the soul?"

Some

people try to prove the immortality of the soul from an objective
point of
view but "do not at all determine their lives in conformity therew
ith."
In these cases, Kierkegaard suggests, no better refutation of their
arguments can be found than the manner of their lives. 1

lIbid., p. 180.
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In addition, one can be in the truth from an objective standpoint and
vet be morally wretched or even insane.

Kierkegaard employs a humorous

tnought experiment to demonstrate that "the objective truth as such is by
no means adequate to determine that whoever utters it is sane .
may even betray the fact that he is mad."
through the window of an asylum.

Imagine a man who escapes

On the road to freedom, the escapee

fixes on a plan to convince the townspeople of his sanity:
only objective truths.

[and]

he shall utter

As he walks along considering his plan,

he sees a ball lying on the ground, picks it up, and puts in into the
tail pocket of his coat. Every step he takes the ball strikes him,
politely speaking, on his hinder parts, and every time it thus
strikes him he says: "Bang, the earth is round." He comes to the
city, and at once calls on one of his friends; he wants to convince
him that he is not crazy, and therefore walks back and forth saying
continually: "Bang, the earth is round!" 1
Each of the above cases illustrates the fundamental distinction in
Kierkegaard's thought between objectivity and subjectivity, and the
corresponding ways in which a person can be rellted to the truth.

From an

objective standpoint the "accent falls on WHAT is said"; whereas from
a
subjective standpoint the emphasis is "on HOW it is said."

In the ethico-

religious sphere (the sphere of essential truth), the "how" of the
relation to the truth is the most important.

"In this manner subjectivity

and the subjective 'how' constitute the truth."2

Indirect Communication
In most of his writings, Kierkegaard is more concerned with the
subjective "how" than the objective "what."

llbid., p. 174.
2Ibid., p. 181.

In his estimation, his
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contemporaries were confused about the objective truth precisely because
they misunderstood (even ignored) subjectivity.

That is to say, they

failed to appreciate the fact that living the truth is a human being's
primary task, and that believing the right things is the result of living
truthfully, not the other way around.
life.

Thought had been divorced from

Kierkegaard attempted to bring about their reconciliation.

His

approach was distinctive, tailored both to the nature of the illness (an
overdose of objective reflection) and of the patient (the human person).
According to Kierkegaard, the human person is fundamentally spirit,
that is, self-determining, free to choose what he or she will be.1
Consequently, genuine change in a person's life cannot be introduced
directly from without, but must originate within the individual, with a
personal decision, an act of the will.

"There are two kinds of disorder,"

he writes:
The one is rioting, exterior hubbub. The other is the stillness cf
death, dissolution, and this is perhaps the most dangerous. Against
this latter I have worked, and I have worked to awaken disquietude
with the aim of effecting inward change.2
He believes, together with the idea that truth (in the very important
sense in which it has to do with human existence) is a matter of personal
appropriation (subjectivity), that to effect an inward change an
individual must be motivated to change herself.
Whereas the communication of objective information may be
accomplished directly, in the form of "results" or "definitions," direct

1John D. Mullen, Kierkegaard's Philosophy (New York: New American
Library, 1981), p. 44.
2Kierkegaard, For Self Examination and Judge for Yourselves!, trans.
Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 45.
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communication tends to inhibit the "self-activity" that leads to genuine
inward change.

Indeed,

in relation to existential concepts it always indicates a greater
discretion to abstain from definitions, because a person can hardly
be inclined to apprehend in the form of a definition what must be
understood differently, what he himself has understood differently,
. . . and which in the form of a definition becomes something else,
something foreign to him
The problem in Kierkegaard's day (as he saw it) was not a shortage of
objective understanding (of which there was, if anything, a surplus), but
rather an absence of what he calls "inwardness."

The development of

inwardness "pertains to someone who is presumed essentially to possess
knowledge and who does not merely need to know something but rather needs
to be influenced."2
To accomplish this inner transformation in the lives of his
countrymen,

Kierkegaard embarked on a literary mission involving a number

of fictitious authors, each representing a different perspective or
approach to life.
their works.

Even their personalities are tailored to the content of

Because these pseudonyms (with the possible exception of

Anti-Climacus) do not represent Kierkegaard's perspective, it would have
been inappropriate and misleading for him to have published their works
under his own name.

The pseudonyms, then, are not simply masks to conceal

the identity of the true author.

They are personae who embody and

articulate various world and life views or "spheres of existence."
In his "First and Last Declaration," appended to the Postscript
Kierkegaard explains that the content of the pseudonymous books

lIdem [Vigilius Haufniensis), The Concept of Anxiety, p. 147
2Idem [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, p. 241.
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required complete regardlessness in the direction of good and evil,
of contrition and high spirits, of despair and presumption, of
suffering and exultation, etc., which is bounded only ideally by
psychological consistency, and which real actual persons in the
actual moral limitations of reality dare not permit themselves to
indulge in, nor could wish to. 1
He adds, moreover, that
in the pseudonymous works there is not a single word which is mine, I
have no opinion about these works except as third person, no
knowledge of their meaning except as reader.2
This does not mean that the pseudonymous works are devoid of insight.

Nor

does it deny that the books may contain expressed opinions that
Kierkegaard himself shares.
read the books:

These remarks suggest, instead, how we should

As if before a mirror, we see ourselves in the

pseudonymous works, responding more or less like their authors to human
experience at the levels they respectively depict.

Kierkegaard's intent

is to confront his readers indirectly (from behind, so to speak), enabling
them through an intensification of self-awareness (inwardness) to
recognize both the partial validity and final inadequacy of certain of the
approaches to life embodied in the pseudonyms.

Existence as a Synthesis
Climacus observes that "if men had forgotten what it means to exist
religiously, they had doubtless also forgotten what it means to exist as
human beings."3

A central element in Kierkegaard's religious philosophy

is his conception of human existence.

In his writings, he attempted to

recover an understanding of human existence, an understanding that had

lIbid., p. 551.
21bid.
31bid., p. 223.
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been lost.

C. Stephen Evans points out that "one point that Kierkegaard

and nearly all of his pseudonyms seem to agree on is that existence,
understood in that special sense in which it refers to the type of
existence human beings have, is a synthesis of contrasting factors," the
most complete analysis of which is provided in The Sickness Unto Death. 1
The Sickness Unto Death appeared in 1849 under the pseudonym, "AntiClimacus," calling to mind the earlier pseudonym, "Johannes Climacus

Of

the two, Kierkegaard writes in his Journals,
Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus have several things in common;
but the difference is that whereas Johannes Climacus places himself
so low that he even says himself that he is not a Christian, one
seems to be able to detect in Anti-Climacus that he regards himself
to be a Christian on an extraordinarily high leve1.2
Kierkegaard considered himself "only a very simple Christian" by
comparison to the "extraordinary" Anti-Climacus.3

He endorsed Anti-

Climacus' analysis of human existence as "absolutely sound," adding, "I
bow to it.”4

Walter Lowrie considers Kierkegaard's utilization of the

pseudonym, Anti-Climacus, an "afterthought .

. adopted merely to relieve

his own feeling of impropriety,"5 as well as a method of focussing
attention on the book's message apart from any association with the actual
author.6

lEvans, p. 56.
2Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, 6:174.
3Ibid.
4Ibid., 6:175.
5Walter Lowrie, Introduction to The Sickness Unto Death, by Soren
Kierkegaard [Anti-Climacus] (New York. Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954), p. 138.
6Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard
(Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1942), p. 217.
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The opening lines of The Sickness Unto Death are a masterpiece of
dialectic, and worth quoting at length:
Man is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is
the self? The self is a relation which relates itself to itself;
. . the self is not the relation but tconsists in) the relation's
relating itself to itself. A human being is a synthesis of the
infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom
[possibility l and necessity, in short, a synthesis. A synthesis is a
relation between two. Considered in this way, a human being is still
not a self. In the relation between the two, the relation is the
third as a negative unity, and the two relate to the relation. . . .
If, however, the relation relates itself to itself, this relation is
the positive third, and this is the self.1
Anti-Climacus does not say that a human being is a spirit, but that a
human being "is spirit."

In this context, "spirit" seems to mean

something like "spirited," that is, self-determining or free.
a relation or synthesis of opposing tendencies.

The self is

But it is also an

awareness of the relation, and not simply the relation itself, for
"considered in this way, a human being is still not a self."

The self is

by definition a self conscious entity, able to "relate itself to itself."
Furthermore, the self is not a harmonious synthesis of the dialectical
pairs finite/infinite, temporal/eternal, and freedom
(possibility)/necessity.
This sets up a point of contrast between Anti-Climacus and
Kierkegaard's archenemy, Hegel.

In the Hegelian dialectic, a primary

stage of unreflective unity is opposed by a secondary stage of reflective
disunity.

The opposites are negated in a natural progression to a

harmonious synthesis of reflective unity.
unity."

This is a kind of "negative

According to Anti-Climacus, the synthesis that constitutes the

1Kierkegaard Anti-Climacus], The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Howard
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p.
13.
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self is neither harmonious nor the result of a natural progression.
Rather, the synthesis is posited by an act of human will, a "leap," a
"positive third term," which is the self.

That the relation is

characterized by tension means that the self faces an "existential
paradox," in which the problem for the self becomes how to relate the
dialectically opposed tendencies that make up the human person.1

Human

existence is thus a constant striving to maintain the synthesis.

To fail

to achieve the synthesis is to be in the state Anti-Climacus calls
"despair."
Every human existence that is not conscious of itself as spirit or
conscious of itself before God as spirit, every human existence that
does not rest transparently [that is, without self deception] in God
. . . , whatever it achieves, be it most amazing, whatever it
explains, be it the whole of existence, however intensively it enjoys
life esthetically [sic]--every such existence is nevertheless
despair.2
The description of the self with which The Sickness Unto Death begins
is the ideal state of the human person, "a state in which there is no
despair at all."3

Anti-Climacus distinguishes two forms of despair:

(1) "in despair not to will to be oneself" and (2) "in despair to will to
be oneself."

If the self were responsible for the fact that it is a

"relation that relates itself to itself," then despair could only be of
the first form.

As it is, however, there is "another" to which the self

relates itself, namely "that which has established the entire relation,"
and without which the self cannot "arrive at or . . . be in equilibrium

1Mullen, p. 46.
2Kierkegaard [Anti-Climacus], The Sickness Unto Death, p. 46.
p. 49.
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and rest."1

Because the self is constituted by another, one can

despairingly "will to be oneself."
Anti-Climacus believes that the possibility of despair is an
"infinite advantage," for it is precisely the possibility of despair that
distinguishes man from the beasts, and "in quite another way than does his
erect walk, for it indicates infinite erectness or sublimity, that he is
spirit."

But "the descent [to despair] is as infinitely low as the

excellence of the possibility is high."

Indeed, "to be in despair is not

only the worst misfortune and misery--no, it is ruination."

Despair is

"the misrelation in the relation of a synthesis that relates itself to
itself."2

In addition, it is not something that just happens to a person

as if it were "something that lies in human nature as such," or "something
he suffers, like a disease .

. or death."3

On the contrary, the

responsibility for being in despair always rests with the individual as a
spirited being.

Despair persists because of an act of will on the part of

the despairing individual.
Anti-Climacus concludes his analysis of the self with what Robert C.
Roberts describes as something like a psychological argument for the
existence of God."4

Anti-Climacus equates the moment when one becomes

"decisively conscious as spirit, as self" with becoming aware or receiving
a deep impression "that there is a God and that 'he,' he himself, exists

lIbid., p. 14.
2Ibid., p. 15.
3Ibid., p. 16.
4Robert C. Roberts, "The Socratic Knowledge of God," in International
Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness Unto Death, ed. Robert L. Perkins
(Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1987), pp. 136-41.
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before this God."1

As Roberts points out, this implies that one cannot

truly be a self willingly, and without despair unless one acknowledges
one's dependence on God.
knows that God exists.

In this way, the self-transparent individual

This knowledge of God is closely connected with

knowledge of the "eternal," "infinite," and "possible" aspects of the
self.

Natural Religion
Kierkegaard is perhaps best known for his trenchant polemic against
the state church in his native Denmark.

The illusion that "in such a land

as ours all are Christians of a sort" is a frequent target of his
penetrating and acrimonious scorn. 2

In his estimation, this confusion

precipitated from nineteenth century Christendom's wholesale accommodation
of Hegelian idealistic coherentism.

To counteract this and similar other

adulterations of basic Christian concepts, Kierkegaard addressed himself
to "the problem of becoming a Christian."3

He explored various levels of

religious awareness from aesthetic preoccupation with experience to the
critical moment in which the consciousness offended by the "absolute
paradox" (the incarnation) suspends "the Reason" and embraces the Truth in
the "happy passion" of faith.4

1Kierkegaard [Anti-Climacus], The Sickness Unto Death, p. 26-7.
2Kierkegaard, The Point of View for My Works as an Author: A Report
to History. trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 6.
3Ibid., p. 22.
4Idem [Johannes Climacus) Philosophical Fragments, trans. by Howard
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985),
p. 73
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Kierkegaard's attempt to elucidate the nature of Christianity is, as
fascinating as it is, at times perplexing.

But the emphasis in what

follows will not be on this aspect of his thought.

Instead, the primary

focus will be on natural religion, or religion per se.

More specifically,

I will analyze the knowledge of God that an individual is capable of apart
from special revelation, religious authority, or any particular religious
tradition.

In the Postscript, Climacus designates this form of religion

"religiousness A," the "religion of immanence," or "Socratic religion," to
distinguish it from what he calls "religiousness B," or "paradoxical
religion," namely, Christianity.
This distinction is found in many of Kierkegaard's writings, a great
many of which are devoted to explicating religiousness A.

This may seem

like a counter productive strategy given that his primary aim was to
"reintroduce Christianity into Christendom."

In fact, it reflects his

awareness of the "tremendous existential compass [that] is possible
outside Christianity" on the one hand. and "what an experience of life is
required as a precondition for properly entering upon Christianity" on the
other)-

As Climacus explains, "religiousness A must first be present in

the individual before there can be any question of becoming aware of the
dialectic of B."2

Being Socratically religious is thus a sort of

precondition for becoming a Christian.

Or, to put it more positively,

religiousness B fulfills religiousness A.
Kierkegaard often depicts Socrates as exemplifying religiousness A.
In The Sickness Unto Death, Anti-Climacus exhorts us "never [to] forget

1 Idem, Postscript, p. 259.
2Ibid., p. 497.
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that Socrates' ignorance was a kind of fear and worship of God."I
Climacus agrees:

"Socrates was in the truth by virtue of his ignorance,

in the highest sense in which this is possible within paganism."2

"In an

intellectual sense," adds Johannes de Silentio (pseudonymous author of
Fear and Trembling), "[Socrates] did make the movement of infinity "3

At

ol_her times, however, he doubts whether religiousness A has ever been
exemplified.

Nonetheless, he clearly regarded it as a possibility for any

human being because "it has only human nature in general as its
assumption."4
Natural religion, then, is the knowledge of God that every human
being has the potential to develop without the aid of revelation,
religious authority, or any particular religious tradition.

A revelation

is the disclosure of something previously hidden or inaccessible.

In the

religious sphere, revelation is God's self-revealing activity through
which he makes known his nature as well as his purposes for and
relationship to humanity.

The greater the emphasis in a given religion on

God's transcendence, the more stress is usually placed on our need of
revelation to know God.

It may be that even to the extent that God is

immanent within human consciousness we remain indirectly dependent on God
to recognize his presence and activity.

In this discussion, however, I

will restrict the definition of revelation to include that which we could

lidem, [Anti-Climacus l, The Sickness Unto Death, p. 99.
2Idem, [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, p. 183.
3Idem, [Johannes de Silentio], Fear and Trembling [with Repetition]
trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1983), p. 69.
4Idem, [Johannes Climacus], Postscript,
p. 496.
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not know or discover about God through the natural capabilities and
tendencies we possess as human beings.
religious autonomy.

We are endowed with some degree of

Indeed, a distinctive feature of Kierkegaard's

approach is that we can either cultivate or ignore the potential we each
have to develop a God-relationship.
Occasionally, transcendent revelation (the disclosure of what is
beyond the powers of humankind to discover) is called "special revelation"
to distinguish it from "general revelation."

General revelation is God's

partial self-disclosure through the created order, his providential
dealings in nature and throughout human history (for example, miracles),
and the moral sensitivity more or less present in all of us.

The

difficulty with creation is that it admits various and even opposing
interpretations.

To one observer, nature may exhibit an order and beauty

such that only a being of infinite wisdom and power could have fashioned
it.

The theist who views nature as the work of God sees it through the

lenses of an "ideal interpretation," an interpretation not given in the
encounter with nature by itself.1

To another observer, however, the

cosmos may appear so random and chaotic that for her it constitutes
evidence against the existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent Being.
Furthermore, God's providential dealings in nature and throughout
human history are open to the same approximation process and uncertainty
inherent in historical judgments generally.

Even when the probability of

an event having occurred is high (as has been said of the resurrection of
Jesus), Kierkegaard considers the slightest degree of reasonable doubt,
attached to even the most reliable of historical judgments, sufficient to

lIbid., Philosophical Fragments, p. 52.
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disqualify that event as a decisive basis for hope in an eternal
happiness.

He deems man's religious aspirations far too important to be

founded on probabilities, curiously maintaining that our knowledge of God
can and should be among the most certain elements of our lives.
Along with revelation, natural religion precludes any religious
authority extraneous to the individual.

A religious authority is someone

thought to possess a unique or unusual degree of religious insight or
awareness

This awareness can be a result of some revelation peculiar to

that person.

The apostle Paul, for example, believed that he had

encountered the resurrected Christ while traveling from Jerusalem to
Damascus, and declared later that his message "is not something that man
made up.

I did not receive it from any man, nor was I taught it; rather.

I received it by revelation from Jesus Christ."1
made similar claims.

Other men and women have

Also, religious authority can be attributed to a

document by virtue of its origin or association with some authoritative
individual.

In either case, knowledge obtained through a religious

authority circumvents an individual's natural religious potential.

Such a

source of knowledge is therefore excluded from the raw materials of the
natural religious life.
Finally, in addition to precluding religious authority, natural
religion does not presuppose any particular religious tradition.

It is

true that Kierkegaard is primarily interested in the problem of becoming a
Christian.

But his reflections on natural religion are not dependent on

the truth or falsity of Christianity.

Indeed, Johannes Climacus (the

"author" of the Postscript, which contains lengthy discussions of Socratic

'Galatians 1:11-12 (New International Version).

25
religion) himself denies that he is a Christian.

His interest in the

confusion between Christianity and speculative philosophy is a sporting
one.'

The only presupposition of natural religion is the universal nature

and potential that exists in everyone regardless of descent or religious
predilections.

That Kierkegaard draws most of his illustrations from

Christianity. even in the pseudonymous works, should neither surprise nor
alarm us, since it was with Christianity that he was most familiar.
The next chapter elucidates how, according to Kierkegaard, an
individual develops an intuitive awareness of God in the sphere of natural
religion.

In brief, God can only be known by the individual who develops

the peculiarly human capacity Kierkegaard calls "inwardness,

. that

lonely wellspring which exists in every man, that wellspring in which the
Deity dwells in the profound stillness where everything is silent."2
most strenuous and intense form of inwardness is faith.

The

Though faith of a

sort is required to know God, Kierkegaard usually links faith sensu
eminentiori ("in an eminent sense") with Christianity—the paradoxical
revelation of the God-man Jesus.3

The natural knowledge of God is

essentially a process of self-discovery.
the process of becoming "a self."

Inwardness is self-knowledge, or

To become a self is indeed "the

greatest concession made to man, but at the same time," cautions AntiClimacus, "it is eternity's demand upon him."4

1Kierkegaard [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, p. 216.
2Ibid., p. 163.
p. 184-5.
4Idem, [Anti-Climacus], The
Sickness Unto Death

p. 154.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

According to Kierkegaard, in the sphere of natural religion, the
knowledge of God is conditioned by an individual's capacity for
inwardness.

In this chapter, after discussing the "divine elusiveness"

and the meaning of "inwardness," I analyze the structural or formative
elements of the natural religious life.

In the extremity of self-

knowledge, an individual grasps the eternal, infinite, and possible
aspects of the human "self "

In this moment of self-discovery, the

individual also encounters God.

After analyzing Kierkegaard's view, I

conclude the chapter with an evaluation of the propriety of his way of
construing the natural knowledge of God.

The Divine Elusiveness
"Every life is religiously designed."1

So says Vigilius Haufniensis,

pseudonymous author of The Concept of Anxiety.

What he means is that

every individual, simply by virtue of being human, has an innate potential
to develop a religious consciousness.

Haufniensis (along with

Kierkegaard) is well aware that not all (indeed few) realize this
potential, and that many are not even conscious of the spiritual dimension
of human existence.

Anti-Climacus laments that

1Kierkegaard [Vigilius Haufniensis], The Concept of Anxiety, p. 105.
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only that person's life is wasted who went on living so deceived by
life's joys and sorrows that he never became decisively and eternally
conscious as spirit, as self, or, what amounts to the same thing,
never became aware and in the deepest sense never gained the
impression that there is a God and that "he," he himself, his self,
exists before this God
In the fragments, Climacus depicts the human understanding as driven by a
"paradoxical passion" to collide with "something that thought itself
cannot think," thereby willing its own downfal1.2

What the understanding

confronts in the moment of this collision is "the unknown," which Climacus
casually refers to as "the god."
was regarded as the unknown."3

"In paganism," Kierkegaard concurs, "God

Climacus defines paganism as the idea

"that God is related to man directly, as the obviously extraordinary to
the astonished observer."4

The difficulty is that God is elusive:

For no anonymous author can more cunningly conceal himself, no
practitioner of the maieutic art can more carefully withdraw from the
direct relationship, than God. He is in the creation, and present
everywhere in it, but directly He is not there.5
"God," Kierkegaard remarks in his Journals

"is at one and the same time

infinitely close to man and infinitely far away."
he so elusive?

If God exists, why is

The answer has to do with both the nature of God (the

object of religious knowledge) and the corresponding character of the
"God-relationship."

1Idem [Anti-Climacus], The Sickness Unto
Death, P. 26-7.
2Idem [Johannes Climacus], Fragments, pp. 37-9.
3Idem, Journals and Papers, 2:100
4Idem [Johannes Climacusj, Postscript, p. 219.
5Ibid., p.218.
6Idem, Journals and Papers, 2:154.
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It is plausible to suppose that God (if such a being exists) cannot
be known by just anyone in just any old way.
areas of human knowledge.

The same is true in other

We ordinarily expect knowledge to be obtainable

in some way, but we do not ordinarily expect everyone to be equally in a
position to obtain it.

For instance, the existence of various rare

species of animals or of subatomic particles can be verified only by a
trained naturalist or physicist, respectively.

As C. Stephen Evans

explains, "In every case the nature of what is known seems to dictate the
conditions under which it can be known and the capacities the knower must
have."1

The object of religious knowledge is God.

he eludes direct sense perception.

Since God is a spirit,

Instead, to know God, the knower must

develop other capacities, capacities peculiarly appropriate to the object
of religious knowledge.
The divine elusiveness is consistent with the possibility of true
relationship to God, which is a spiritual (inwardly developed)
relationship.

"But the spiritual relationship to God in truth, when God

refuses to deceive, requires precisely that there be nothing remarkable
about the figure."2

Climacus suggests that God is "so unnoticeable, so

secretly present in His works" that a man could live out his life as a
husband and father, a respected citizen and captain of the hunt, but for
all that never really become aware of God's reality.
Such a man might perhaps know many things, perhaps even know the
System by rote; he might be an inhabitant of a Christian country, and
bow his head whenever the name of God was mentioned; he would perhaps
also see God in nature when in company with others who saw God; he
would be a pleasant society man--and yet he would have been deceived

1Evans, p. 153.
2Kierkegaard [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, p. 220.
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by the direct nature of his relationship to the truth, to the
ethical, and to Cod)
Were God to grant a direct relationship, our society man's attention would
doubtless be aroused "if God, for example, had taken on the figure of a
very rare and tremendously large green bird, with a red beak, sitting in a
tree on the mound, and perhaps even whistling in an unheard of manner."2
Or perhaps he would take notice if God appeared "in human form . . . [in]
the figure of a man six yards tall."3

In the religious sphere, however, a

direct relationship between God and man--both spiritual beings--is
impossible.

"Cod is spirit--and man's task is to be transformed to

spirit; but spirit is opposed to being related to God by way of external
evidence."4

The point is that although the natural knowledge of God is

immediate in a way analogous to sense perception, it is nevertheless not
an encounter in sense experience.

Rather, in the sphere of natural

religion, one encounters God as an object of contemplation.
Climacus marvels that in an age so dominated by direct communication
"it occurs to no one to register a complaint against God."5

Kierkegaard

maintains nonetheless that the divine elusiveness is both "God's
sublimity" and "the infinite love of God."

When a person mistakes some

lIbid., p. 219.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., p. 220.
4Idem, Journals and Papers. 1:105-6.
5Idem [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, P. 217.
6Idem. Journals and Papers, 1:106.
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sensible object for God, she fails to grasp God's true nature, and thereby
also fails to enter into a true God-relationship.
But the spiritual relationship to God
inwardness, is conditioned by a prior
corresponds to the divine elusiveness
obvious about Him, that God is so far
invisible. 1
God's invisibleness is his omnipresence.

in the truth, i.e. in
eruption of inwardness, which
that God has absolutely nothing
from being obvious that He is

Nature is the work of God, and

Cod's presence permeates nature, yet God is not directly present in his
creation.

"Only when the individual turns to his inner self, and hence

only in the inwardness of self-activity, does he have his attention
aroused, and is enabled to see God."2

In his Journals, Kierkegaard likens

the divine elusiveness, and the corresponding nature of the God relationship, to a seduction:

"God is cunning, so to speak; he is the

invisible one who quite secretly is responsible for the development of a
person's life in this way, but God gives no sign .

."3

The impossibility of a direct relationship to God highlights the
limitations of objective reflection.

Objective reflection sometimes takes

the form of abstract thought, which always points away from existence.
takes care of existential problems by leaving them out.
that God does not exist in abstract thought.

It

The problem is

"Immanently (in the

imaginative medium of abstraction) God does not exist or is not present;
he is--only for the existing person is God present."4

God's presence can

only be known by the individual who approaches it with existential pathos,

lIdem [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, p. 219.
2Ibid., p. 218.
3Idem, Journals and Papers, 2:112.
4Ibid., 2:97.
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by one who brings the existence of God into concrete relation with his own
existence as an object of subjective reflection ("concrete thought").
The contrast is between two different modes of approaching
existential problems.

Whereas objective reflection "is directed to the

problem of whether this object is the true God," subjective reflection "is
directed to the question whether the individual is related to something in
such a manner that his relationship is in truth a God-relationship."1
Recall Climacus's startling claim that "if only the mode of this
relationship is in the truth, the individual is in the truth even if he
should happen to be thus related to what is not true."2
To illustrate the above point, Climacus proposes another thought
experiment:
If one who lives in the midst of Christendom goes up to the house of
God, the house of the true God, with the true conception of God in
his knowledge, and prays, but prays in a false spirit; and one who
lives in an idolatrous community prays with the entire passion of the
infinite, although his eyes rest upon the image of an idol: where is
there the most truth? The one prays in truth to God even though he
worships an idol; the other prays falsely to the true God, and hence
worships in fact an ido1.3
In a footnote, he adds the important qualification that the question,
again, is about essential truth, "truth which is essentially related to
existence, 14 and In which personal appropriation plays a major role.

The

idolater is "in [the] truth" from a subjective point of view by virtue of
his passion, even though from an objective standpoint the immediate object
1'dem [Johannes Climacus), Postscript,
p. 178.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., p.179-80.
4Ibid., p. 178.
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of his devotion is something sensible, and therefore false.

The "false

spirit" of the individual "in the midst of Christendom"
places him outside
the truth (from a subjective standpoint).

Though his conception of God is

objectively true, his false relationship to God makes him
an idolater.
(Kierkegaard undoubtedly modeled the latter individual aft
-u- the majority
of his learned countrymen.)
What is the "inwardness of self-activity" in which one someho
w
receives the ability to "see God?"

In The Concept of Anxiety, Haufniensis

("The Watchman of Copenhagen") alludes to Judge William's
remark in
Either/Or that "the true autodidact is precisely in the same
degree also a
theodidact."1

In his Journals, Kierkegaard agrees with Julius Muller that

in creating man God "theomorphizes."

Therefore, not everything a person

comes to believe about God on the basis of self-reflectio
n should be
dismissed as anthropomorphic.

Otherwise (quoting Muller), "God could not

have made man more unqualified to know him than by creating
him in his
image."2
Anti-Climacus equates becoming "a self" with resting "trans
parently
[that is. without self-deception] in the Power that establ
ished it."3
Climacus agrees that "it is the God-relationship that makes
a man a man "4
Ethically speaking, it is every individual's responsibility
to become a
self, which presupposes that every person is born with
the potential to
become one.

It is this potentiality to become a self (a spirit) that is

lidera [Vigilius Haufniensis], The Concept of Anxiety, p. 162.
2Idem, Journals and Pajpers, 1:29.
3Idem [Anti-Climacus], The Sickness Unto Death, p. 14.
4Idem [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, p. 219
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"awakened in inwardness to become a God-relationship..1

"Spiritual

development is self-activity,"2 and this self-activity involves
actualizing one's self in an ethical sense.

In Either/Or, Judge William

relates such a moment of self-actualization:
So when all has become still around one, as solemn as a starlit
night, when the soul is alone in the whole world, then there appears
before one not a distinguished man, but the eternal Power itself.
The heavens part,. as it were, and the I chooses itself--or rather,
receives itself. 3
In the sphere of natural religion, knowledge of God is essentially
self-awareness or self-knowledge, knowledge of what it is to exist
humanly, to be a self.

The distinctive feature of Socratic religion, or

the religion of immanence, is that man has the truth within him already.
Correspondingly, the failure to develop one's innate potential to acquire
a God-relationship is a failure of self-knowledge.

In mature adults, this

failure always involves some measure of self-deception, refusing to
acknowledge something more or less evident about one's self.

Vigilius

Haufniensis (another of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms) calls the state of such
a person "the absence of inwardness."

"If the absence of inwardness were

brought about mechanically [that is, as a result of crocesses beyond one's
control]," he adds, then "all consideration of it would be wasted
effort."4

However, inwardness belongs to self-reflection, and the lack of

it is rooted in a failure of self-knowledge in which the individual is

lIbid., p. 221.
2Ibid., p. 309.
31dem [Victor Erimita], Either/Or, 2 vols., trans Walter Lowrie and
Howard A. Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 2:181.
4Idem [Vigilius Haufniensis], The Concept of Anxiety, p. 144.
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active, and for which the individual is therefore in some sense
responsible.

What, then, is irwardness, and how does turning to one's

"inner self . . . in the inwardness of self-activity" enable one to "see
Cod?"

Inwardness
"God is a subject," writes Climacus, "and therefore exists only for
subjectivity in inwardness."2

In his own account of how he became

interested in the misunderstanding between speculative philosophy and
Christianity, he observes that despite "the great increase in knowledge,"
his contemporaries had "forgotten what it means to exist
inwardness signifies."3

and what

Though the notion pervades his writings,

Kierkegaard does not provide us with a straightforward definition of
inwardness.

Haufniensis, pseudonymous author of The Concept of Anxiety

does make "a few remarks for orientation" regarding inwardness in a
section from that work entitled, "Anxiety as Sin or Anxiety as the
Consequence of Sin in the Single Individual."4
Aware of the difficulty of constructing a definition of inwardness,
Haufniensis elects "in the meantime" to say that it is "earnestness."
"Inwardness is precisely the fountain that springs up unto eternal life,
and what issues from this fountain is precisely earnestness."5

lIdem [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, p. 218.
2Ibid., p. 178.
p. 223.
4Idem [Anti-Climacus',
The Concept of Anxiety, PP• 146-154.
5Ibid., p. 146.

He notes

35
with satisfaction the lack of even a single definition of earnestness.
Like other existential concepts, earnestness cannot be defined directly
without misleading those for whom the definition is intended.

A lover

would hardly be satisfied with a definition of love, just as one who
"lives in daily and festive communion with the thought that there is a
God" would hardly be content with a definition of what God is.

The same

is true of earnestness, "which is so earnest a matter that even a
definition of it becomes a frivolity."1

Haufniensis defends his refusal

to offer a definition of earnestness as proviTg "much better than any
conceptual development that I do know in earnest what the discussion is
about," and not based on the "fear that some supershrewd speculator might
become suspicious of me, as if I did not quite know whereof I speak."2
In his "remarks," Haufniensis points out that earnestness has a
dispositional character.

But it is not like any ordinary disposition.

It

is "a higher as well as the deepest expression of what disposition i s."3
In this sense, it constitutes the core of one's personality, provided that
it is directed toward the proper object.

One can be earnest about all

manner of things, from the national debt to a performance at the theater.
Indeed, an individual's "worth" may be gauged by discerning what sorts of
things she is earnest about.

The primary object of earnest is properly

oneself, "and whoever has not become earnest about this, but about
something else, something great and noisy, is despite all his earnestness

lIbid., p. 147.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., p. 148.
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a joker."1

One who becomes deeply earnest about the wrong sorts of things

is comical in the sense that the level of interest or concern expressed is
incongruous with the relative importance of the object.

One who has

"become earnest in the right place," however, "will prove the soundness of
his spirit precisely by his ability to treat all other things
sentimentally as well as jokingly."2

Properly directed earnestness

enables one to bring one's concerns into harmony by not assigning a
disproportionate level of concern to the relative (finite) ends of life.
Genuine earnestness is first and foremost a deep and abidiLg concern (a
passion) for one's own existence.
Inwardness, then, is an enduring concern for one's own concrete
existence.

It also includes the concerns that become the ground of the

God-relationship in the fully developed personality.

Furthermore, the

concerns that mold the personality in the existential pathos of inwardness
are not present in an individual from birth--"no one is born with
earnestness.

They must be developed, and a human being is capable of

resisting or even thwarting their development.
The development of inwardness is largely the cultivation of certain
passions or concerns.

The concerns that are the ground of the God -

relationship in the sphere of natural religion pertain to the distinctive
and essential elements of human existence.

It is the task of the

subjective thinker "to transform himself into an instrument that clearly

1Ibid., p. 130.
2Ibid.
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and definitely expresses whatever is essentially human."1

Thus, the

cultivation of these concerns is in an important sense a process of selfdiscovery, of discovering the "essentially human" aspects of one's self.
What does the self have to discover about itself in order to "see God?"
Kierkegaard answers this question in terms of the synthesis of the
elements that constitute the self:

the dialectical pairs

temporal/eternal, finite/infinite, and freedom (possibility)/necessity.

The Eternal, the Ethical, and the Absolute Telos
The first aspect of the self to consider is the dialectical pair
temporal/eternal.

A key concept in Kierkegaard's phenomenology of the

religious life is "the eternal."

"Inwardness," says Haufniensis, "is

. eternity or the constituent of the eternal in man," and "whoever has
not understood it altogether concretely, lacks inwardness and
earnestness."2

Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms use the expression "the

eternal" in several distinct ways.3

The uses relevant to this discussion

are those that pertain to human existence.
eternal" that we need to consider:

There are two senses of "the

"the eternal" as a constituent of

human existence, and "the eternal" as the goal or end of human existence.
The former of the two senses of "the eternal" applies to the initial
moments of subjective awakening (that is, of self-awareness or
inwardness).

Intellectually, an individual contemplates eternity in the

lIdem [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, p. 318.
2Idem [Vigilius Haufniensis), The Concept of Anxiety, p. 151.
3delineated in Evans, pp. 59-64.
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guise of "universal possibilities."1
one who not only thinks but acts.

But a human being, as an exister, is

Therefore, the individual also reflects

on some of these possibilities as possibilities for action, with some more
worthy of fulfillment than others.

So the initial encounter with "the

eternal" is the birth of ethical awareness.

In this sense, ethics is "the

essential anchorage for all individual existence," and has "an
indefeasible claim upon every existing individual."2

Moreover, in the

course of ethical reflection, one becomes cognizant of certain
possibilities for action as timeless, unchanging, and universally binding,
in a word, eternal.
the ethical

"Whoever does not apprehend the eternal validity of

does not really apprehend the ethical."3

"The ethical

is the very breath of the eternal."4
In the Postscript, Climacus makes it clear that knowledge of the
eternal--conceived as absolutely binding moral obligations (ethical
values)--is an exercise in self-knowledge.

"For the study of the

ethical," he avers, "every man is assigned to himself."5

Though the

individual discovers the ethical through self-reflection, the ethical also
points to another:
The ethical is . . . a correlative to individuality, and to such a
degree that each individual apprehends the ethical essentially only

lIbid., p. 61.
2Kierkegaard [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, 119.
3Ibid., p. 128.
4Ibid., p. 136.
5Ibid., p. 137.
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in himself, because the ethical is his complicity with God. (Italics
mine.)1
The eternal moral qualities an individual discovers as an exister he
conceives as grounded in God.

In this way, ethical self-understanding

culminates in a God-relationship.
evil . .

"The true distinction between good and

exists only in the individual, and in the last analysis only in

each individual in his God-relationship."2
When a person exercises his freedom as a responsible agent in accord
with his ethical duty as he perceives it, God's reality becomes apparent
to him.

"Freedom is the true wonderful lamp;" writes Climacus, "when a

man rubs it with ethical passion, God comes into being for him."3

The

attribute of God that comes to light in the context of an individual's
"eternal consciousness" is God's role as moral ruler and judge.
In the world-historical process as this is viewed by human beings,
God does not play the role of sovereign; just as the ethical fails to
appear in it, so God also fails to appear, for if he is not seen as
sovereign he is not seen at al1.4
To the human being with ethical passion, God appears as Lord.
The ethical task is to realize one's self as a being with eternal
significance.

Ethical passion is "willing to the utmost limits of one's

power" to actualize the moral obligations one encounters in the course of
existence.

In this sense, human existence is "a successive process in

which the individual can recognize and attempt to actualize 'the eternal'

lIbid., p. 138.
2Ibid., p. 139.
3Ibid., p. 124.
4Ibid , pp. 139-40.
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(ethical values)."
existence.

Ethical existence is implicitly a religious

Nevertheless, it is possible to live the ethical life without

recognizing that in doing so one is also relating one's self to God.

The

first sense of "the eternal" is closely linked to the second, in which
"the eternal" is conceived as the goal or end of human existence.

In

realizing "the eternal" in this second sense, an individual's existence
takes on an explicitly religious dimension.
"The ethical," writes Climacus, "is and remains the highest task for
every human being."2

The mark of pure ethical passion is its utter

disregard for "results."
The true ethical enthusiasm consists in willing to the utmost limits
of one's powers, but at the same time being so uplifted in divine
jest as never to think about the accomplishment. As soon as the will
begins to look right and left for results, the individual begins to
become immoral. The energy of the will is slackened . . .
There nonetheless "comes into being for the individual who becomes
subjective" (that is, the individual whose personality is molded by
ethical passion) the concept of a "highest reward, an eternal happiness."'
An eternal happiness is the end or goal of ethical existence.

This is the

second important sense of "the eternal" as it applies to human existence,
the thought of which "possesses a power and weightiness in its
consequences, a responsibility in the acceptance of it, which perhaps will

lEvans, p. 72.
2Kierkegaard [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, P. 135.
3Ibid., p. 121.
p. 146.
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recreate life in a way that is feared."I

A passion for one's own eternal

happiness
consists in the transformation by which everything in the existence
of the individual is altered, in and through, his mode of existence,
so as to bring it into conformity with this highest good.2
To conceive of an eternal happiness as a reward seems to violate our
intuitions about the ethical life.

A person with pure ethical passion is

supposed to strive to fulfill his moral obligations without regard for the
results.

But if we view an eternal happiness as internal to the ethical

life itself, the tension is resolved.

In general, some rewards are

external to whatever they are rewards for, such as the practice of giving
a child a nickel for every good grade on her report card.

Other rewards

are more intimately connected, or internal to their antecedent activities.
For Sherlock Holmes, Arthur Conan Doyle's famous consulting detective, to
solve a case is its own reward.

No reward could be finer that the

opportunity to exercise his formidable deductive powers in unraveling the
clues to another mystery.
ethical existence.

Similarly, an eternal happiness is internal to

An eternal happiness is thus "conceived as the

perfect, endless realization of the eternal moral qualities man discovers
as an exister and conceives as realized in God."3
This way of describing an eternal happiness is derived from
Climacus's somewhat less direct attempt to characterize it in the
Postscript.
good."

He refrains from straightforwardly defining the "highest

"What is immortality?" he argues,

[Vigilius Haufniensis)

The Concept of Anxiety, p. 139.

2Idem [Johannes Climacusi, Postscript, p. 348.
3Evans, p. 63.
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Is essentially not a learned question, rather it is a question of
inwardness, which the subject by becoming subjective must put to
himself. Objectively the question cannot be answered, because
objectively it cannot be put, since immortal_ty precisely is the
potentiation and highest development of the developed subjectivity 1
Though he balks at offering anything like a concise, definitive
description, Climacus does provide a few criteria for distinguishing the
ethically pure concept of an eternal happiness.
The first of these criteria is that an eternal happiness cannot be
"aesthetically" defined.

Climacus is aware that many such purported

definitions exist.
When a so-called religious personality pleases to picture an eternal
happiness in all the magic colors of the imagination, it means that
he is a runaway poet, a deserter from the sphere of the aesthetic,
who claims the privilege of native citizenship in the realm of the
religious without even being able to speak its mother tongue.2
The "mother tongue" of the religious life is the ethical.

Climacus

caricatures the man who asks for a description of an eternal happiness
"'while I shave,' as one describes a woman's beauty, the royal purple, or
distant landscapes."3

But no such attempt to bring the eternal under

"aesthetic categories" is possible.
"It is quite consistent," continues Climacus, "that the highest
pathos of the essentially existing human being

that is, an eternal

happiness] should correspond to what is aesthetically the poorest of all
conceptions."

From an ethical perspective, it is appropriate that the

individual "not be tempted to waste his time in picturing and imagining,
but rather be impelled to [ethical] action."

Furthermore, we should not

1Kierkegaard [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, p. 154.
2Ibid., p. 349.
p. 351.
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be surprised to discover an aesthetic person (one who lacks ethical and
religious passion) for whom this idea of an eternal happiness is
unappealing

As Climacus observes,

It has been said wittily, and [from an aesthetic point of view] . .
quite correctly, that angels are the most tiresome of all creatures,
that eternity is the longest and most wearisome of all days, even a
single Sunday being sufficiently boring; and that an eternal
happiness is an everlasting monotony, so that even the unhappiness of
the damned is to be preferred.1
The second distinguishing mark of the ethically pure concept of an
eternal happiness is that the concern for one's own eternal happiness is
qualitatively distinct from concern for temporal, relative (finite) ends.
"All relative volition is marked by willing something for the sake of
something else," something external.

Devotion to the "highest end,"

however, "involves a volitional concentration in the highest sense.
The highest end must be willed for its own sake."2

To will a finite

(temporal) end absolutely is a contradiction, since there must come a time
when it can no longer be willed.

"But to will absolutely is to will the

infinite, and to will an eternal happiness is to will absolutely, because
this is the end which can be willed every moment."3

In this sense, an

eternal happiness is "the absolute telos."
The individual whose existence expresses the proper relation to an
eternal happiness as the absolute telos remains in the realm of finite
(relative) ends.
of his existence.

But his relation to those ends should not be the focus
"The individual is in truth in the relative ends with

lIbid., p. 352.
2Ibid., p. 353.
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the direction toward the absolute telos; but he is not so in them as
to
exhaust himself in them."1

One who is "exhausted" by relative ends has no

room in his life to pursue the highest good, unless the absolute telos
is
"mediated"--"placed on a level with everything else" so that it becomes
just "one end among many."

Climacus parodies the individual whose list of

personal achievements lumps an eternal happiness together with
the dignity of an aldermanic title, to be known as a clever worker at
the office, to be the first ranking lover in the dramatic club,
almost an expert on the violin, a champion rifle -shot, a member of
the Hospital board, [and] a noble father carrying himself with
dignity.2
Such an individual is "in short . . . a devil of a fellow," a person who
"has time for everything .

. [and] can both do all this and at the same

time find leisure to direct his life toward the absolute telos."3
The absolute telos cannot be "mediated" without abrogating its unique
status as the highest good.

A person's duty

is to exercise the absolute relationship to the absolute telos,
striving to reach the maximum of maintaining simultaneously a
relationship to the absolute telos and to relative ends, not by
mediating them, but by making the relationship to the absolute telos
absolute, and the relationship to relative ends relative.4
This distinction "is just the thing to clear a space about the eternal
end, so as to make room for it, just as a marshal clears the way for a
procession.

It keeps the mob of relative ends at a distance."5

To have a

relative relationship to relative ends is to be prepared to renounce

Ibid., p. 359.
2Ibid., p. 39.

4Ibid., p. 364.
5Ibid., p. 369.
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everything (all "finite satisfactions") "in favor of an eternal
happiness "1

"The first genuine expression for the relationship to the

absolute telos . .

," then, is "total renunciation."2

The individual

whose life expresses a relationship to the absolute telos is resign
ed to
suffer the loss of everything temporal in order to realize "the eterna
l":
What the conception of God or an eternal happiness is to effect
in
the individual is, that he transforms his entire existence in
relation thereto, and this transformation is a process of dying away
from the immediate."3
A third and final distinguishing mark of the ethically pure concept
of an eternal happiness "as an absolute good" is "being definable solely
in terms of the mode of acquisition."

"There is nothing to be said of an

eternal happiness except that it is the good which is attained by
venturing everything absoiutely."4
eternal happiness is ethical action.

The "mode of acquisition" of an
To make an absolute venture is to

commit one's self with the entire passion of one's being to an idea that
is, from an objective standpoint, an uncertainty.

True ethical passion

requires that the individual risk everything in a daring venture, not
with
"a tumultuous shriek, however reckless," but with "a quiet consecration
which makes sure of nothing beforehand."5

If the end is certain, then one

does not venture, but merely makes an exchange --in this case a moral
lIbid., p. 350.
2Ibid., p. 362.
3Ibid., p. 432.
4Ibid., p. 382.
5Ibid., p. 133.
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existence for an eternal happiness.

Nevertheless, "the absolute telos

exists for the individual only when he yields it an absolute
devotion."'
To summarize, as the self-aware individual encounters "the eterna
l,"
her existence takes on an ethical dimension.

Ethical passion develops

into a passion for an eternal happiness (an eternal life of moral purity
).
This knowledge of "the eternal" aspect of the self is at the same time
a
knowledge of God:

the "one who distinguishes absolutely [that is, between

an eternal happiness and temporal, finite ends j has a relationship to the
absolute telos, and ipso facto also a relationship to God."2

This claim

rests on the plausible assumption that the best way to view moral
obligation is to construe it as relation between persons.3

Human beings

typically experience moral obligations as commands, the source of which
is
personal.

In the sphere of natural religion, God is conceived as the

ground or source of absolutely binding moral obligations.
In Fear and Trembling

Johannes de Silentio comments on this kind of

religious knowledge:
The ethical is the universal, and as such it is also the divine.
Thus it is proper to say that every duty is essentially duty to God.
. . . The duty becomes duty by being traced back to God, but in the
duty itself I do not enter into relation to God. .
If in this
connection I then say that it is my duty to love God, I am actual
ly
pronouncing only a tautology, inasmuch as "God" in a totally abstra
ct
sense is here understood as the divine--that is, the universal, that
is, the duty.4

lIbid., p. 355.
2Ibid., p. 369.
3Evans, p. 157.
4Idem [Johan
nes de Silentio], Fear and Trembling [with Repetition),
P• 68.
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Johannes de Silentio is particularly interested in the border between
natural religion (the religion of immanence) and transcendent religion
(Christianity).

He agrees with Climacus that one encounters God in the

context of ethical self-knowledge.

The self-knower encounters God as the

law giver to whom one is somehow accountable.

The Infinite
The remaining dialectical pairs to consider in our effort to
understand what (according to Kierkegaard) the self must discover about
itself to "see God" are infinitude/finitude and freedom
(possibility)/necessity.

In The Sickness Unto Death, Anti-Climacus

describes the self as "the conscious synthesis of infinitude and finitude
. whose task is to become itself, which can be done only through the
relationship to God."1

To become a self is to become "concrete," which

signifies that one is neither simply infinite nor simply finite, but a
synthesis of both.

The process of becoming a self involves "an infinite

moving away from itself in the infinitizing of the self, and an infinite
coming back to itself in the finitizing process."2

The finite is thus the

"limiting" constituent of the self, and the infinite is the "extending"
constituent.

To remain at either extreme is to be in despair.

To lack finitude is to despair at the extreme of infinitude.
Imagination is the "infinitizing" faculty of a person.

The infinite is

the fantastic, the limitless --whatever carries a person away from herself
and/or her circumstances.

lIdem, rAntiClimacusJ
2Ibid., p. 30.

Anti-Climacus analyzes the infinitizing faculty

The Sickness Unto Death, pp. 29-30.
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with respect to three human activities:

feeling, knowing, and willing.

When feeling becomes fantastic, it becomes more and more abstract from
any
concrete particular object.

In the end, it becomes "a kind of abstract

sentimentality," and therefore less and less human--the self gradually
loses itself.

Knowing that has become fantastic divorces itself from the

actual state of affairs, ignoring selected points of reality.

Unless

accompanied by a proportional increase in self-awareness, knowledge
tends
to lead the knower further away from rather than nearer the self.
Finally, willing that has become fantastic fails to actualize its
intentions to the extent that it is possible to do so in a given stretc
h
of time.

Instead, it "loses itself" in intentions by failing to actualize

at least some portion of them.

In the end, it "ceases to be will, becomes

volatilized in promises and resolutions that amount to nothing--and
thereby the same is the case with the self, whose will it is."1
The self in the despair of infinitude (whether with respect to
feeling, knowing, or willing) "leads a fantasized [sic] existence .
continually lacking its self, from which it only moves further and furthe
r
away.n 2

In a religious existence, the God-relationship is "infinitizing."

Hence, though a God-relationship is essential to actualizing one's full
humanity, it also presents a danger.

Unless a person is thoroughly

conscious of his existence as concrete --bounded to some extent by his
finitude --the God-relationship "can so sweep a man off his feet that
his
1Kierkegaard, marginal notation in draft of The Sickness Unto Death.
See Kierkegaard [Anti-Climacus], The Sickness Unto Death, p. 149.
2Ibid., p. 32.
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state is simply an intoxication."1

Avoiding this form of despair requires

a healthy awareness of one's own limitations.

At the opposite extreme

lies the form of despair in which one utterly lacks infinitude--the
despair of finitude.
"To lack infinitude," says Anti-Climacus, "is despairing
reductionism, [ethical] narrowness."2

To lose one's self by becoming

"finitized" is to become totally immersed in worldly and temporal (that
is, finite) affairs

It is to shrink from becoming a self before God, and

instead to become "like the others, to become a copy, a number, a mass
man..3

Whereas the despair of infinitude is a reflection of a fantastical

God-relationship, the despair of finitude reflects a thoroughly "secular
mentality" in which the consciousness of God is totally absent.

The

antidote for the despair of finitude is an increase in the self's
awareness of its infinitude.

To see how an awareness of infinitude can

lead to an awareness of God, we need to introduce the final pair of
contrasting elements that constitute the self:

freedom

(possibility)/necessity.

The Possible
The dialectical pair possibility/necessity is a specific application
of the infinitude/finitude dialectic to the questions:
with m- life?

Who can I be?

Who can I not be?"4

"What shall I do

Anti-Climacus points

lIbid., p. 32.
2Ibid., p. 33.
3Ibid., p. 34.
4John Douglas Mullen, Kierkegaard's Philosophy (New York: New
American Library, 198:), p. 49.
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out that "just as finitude is the limiting aspect in relation to
infinitude, so also necessity is the constraint in relation to
possibility."
itself.

The self is a possibility in the sense that it must become

Conversely, to the extent that the self is itself, that is to

say, is just what it is, it is "the necessary."

As before, to be at

either extreme is to be in despair.
To lack necessity is the despair of possibility.

In the despair of

possibility, the self "runs away" with a variety of possible selves it
could become.
overwhelmed.
actual."

Ultimately, craving possibility, the self becomes
"More and more becomes possible because nothing becomes

In the end, "everything becomes possible" in the finite realm.

Anti-Climacus identifies this as "the point at which the abyss swallows up
the self."

What the despairing individual lacks is "the power to obey, to

submit to the necessity in one's life, to what may be called one's
limitations."2

One must learn to curb possibility by reckoning with

necessity, with a realistic assessment of who and what one is at the
present time.
On the other hand, to lack possibility is the despair of necessity.
"To lack possibility means either that everything has become necessary for
a person or that everything has become trivial."3

The only remedy for

life's hopelessness in this situation is to "get possibility."
Possibility can sometimes be created by "the ingeniousness of the human
imagination."

But the person who is honestly (that is, without self-

1Kierkegaard [Anti-Climacus], The Sickness Unto Death, p. 35.
2Ibid., p. 36.
3Ibid., p. 40.

51
deception) "brought to his extremity" realizes that "humanly speaking,
there is no possibility."1

In isolation, the human individual lacks the

resources to overcome the despair of necessity.

"In despair his soul's

despair fights to be permitted to despair, to attain, if you please, the
composure to despair, to obtain the total personality's consent to despair
and be in despair."2
drives it to despair.

The self's awareness of its finitude (necessity)
But without some way to satisfy its need for

possibility, the self is unwilling to completely let go of the finite --it
lacks "the composure to despair."
this helps:

For the person at this extremity, "only

that for God everything is possible."3

As the self-

transparent individual grapples with finitude, determinism threatens to
suffocate or extinguish the self.

Belief in the God for whom all things

are possible enables the self to breathe.
Of course, that God makes all things possible should not catapult the
self to the opposite extremity in which everything is possible (the
despair of possibility).

The God disclosed through the despair of

necessity is a God who is benevolent, a God who can be trusted.

That God

is trustworthy should be especially clear to the person who has a
developed awareness of "the eternal"--of one's duty to conform to the
moral obligations one discovers in the course of existence, and conceives
as emanating from and perfectly realized in God.

The trustworthiness of

the God who is both the source of possibilities and the ground of ethical
reality is assured.

lIbid., p. 38.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., p. 39.
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In addition to God's trustworthiness, the self-aware person realizes
something else about God's nature.

"For prayer," argues Anti-Climacus,

"there must be a God, as self--and possibility--or a self and possibility
in a pregnant sense."'

Prayer is a form of interaction with God.

Possibility "in a pregnant sense" is real possibility, possibility that
can become actuality.

For the determinist, either God does not exist, or

God's will determines every event.
is impossible.

In either case, interaction with God

Prayer requires that there be possibilities.

Hence, the

God for whom all things are possible is a God with whom human beings are
capable of interacting.

"That God's will is the possible makes me able to

pray."2
Anti-Climacus's phenomenology of despair with respect to the
dialectical pair freedom (possibility)/necessity concurs with
Haufniensis's treatment of anxiety in a section of The Concept of Anxiety
entitled, "Anxiety as Saying Through Faith."

Anxiety is the emotion tha:

accompanies viewing one's circumstances as insecure in some respect in
which one desires security.3

Haufniensis equates the individual who is

"educated by anxiety" with one who is "educated by possibility . .
according to his finitude."4

"Anxiety," he explains, "is neither a

category of necessity nor a category of freedom; it is entangled

'Ibid., p. 40.
2Ibid.
3Roberts, "The Socratic Knowledge of God," in International
Kierkegaard Commentary: The Concept of Anxiety, ed. Robert L. Perkins
(Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1985), p. 135.
4Kierkegaard [Vigilius Haufniensis], The Concept of Anxiety, p. 156.
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freedom."'

Anxiety is "the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the

spirit wants to posit the synthesis

that is, the self] and freedom looks

down into its own possibility, laying hold of finiteness to support
itsPlf."2

Anxiety accompanies the awareness of possibility, the moment in

which freedom becomes "entangled" in possibility.
Furthermore, Haufniensis distinguishes "anxiety about something
external"--"about men and finitudes"--from "the anxiety of the possible."3
The anxiety of the possible "consumes all finite ends and discovers all
their deceptiveness."4

Finite ends are all the worldly and temporal

affairs in which the self is tempted to lose itself in the despair of
finitude.

"For freedom, the possible is the future,"5 and the

deceptiveness of finite ends is that they can all be taken away in the
future, at any moment.

"In possibility, all things are possible," and the

one who "graduates from the school of possibility .

[knows] that the

terrible, perdition, and annihilation live next door to every man."6

The

one who recognizes the insecurity of finite ends as a whole experiences
the anxiety of the possible.
Through the anxiety of the possible the soul learns to rest in
Providence.

"Anxiety enters into his soul and searches out everything and

1Ibid., p. 49.
2Ibid., p. 61.
3Ibid., p. 157.
p. 155.
5Ibid., P• 91.
6Ibid., P• 156.

anxiously torments everything finite and petty out of him."1

In the end,

the soul's shrewd attempts to negotiate its anxiety through "innumerable
calculations" and "clever combinations vanish like a witticism."2

Rather

than entrust itself to finite ends, the soul learns to entrust itself to
Providence, entering into a God-relationship.

Evaluation
Kierkegaard's thesis is that the natural knowledge of God is a
product of self-knowledge, or the process of becoming a self.
for Yourselves!

In Judge

he calls this the process of "becoming sober."

sober "is Lo_ come to oneself in self-knowledge. and before God
before Him

yet infinitely

absolutely

under obligation."3

To become
as nothing

On his

account of human existence, the self is constituted by a synthesis of
contrasting elements.

To "see God" the individual must reckon with the

eternal, infinite, and possible aspects of the self.

One cannot truly be

a self willingly and without despair unless one acknowledges one's
dependence on God.

"Only by being before God can a man entirely come to

himself in the transparency of sobriety."4

In a discourse entitled "Man's

Need of God Constitutes his Highest Perfection," Kierkegaard elaborates on
the connection between self-knowledge and the knowledge of God:
In so far as a man does not know himself, nor understand that he can

p. 159.
2Ibid., p. 161.
3Idem, For Self Examination and Judge for Yourselves!, p. 120.
4Ibid. , p. 122.
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of himself do nothing, he does not really become aware, in any deeper
sense, that God exists. I
A man who does not know himself may understand who God is.
invoke God's name in the midst of the crises of his life.

He may even
Yet "he is in a

manner piously deceived if he deems himself on this account clearly
.2

conscious of God's existence

Kierkegaard assumes that the self-knower is able to generate the
concept of God out of his self-knowledge.

But is this really possible?

Roberts takes up this question in his article on the Socratic knowledge of
God.

He divides experiences of God into two kinds:

unmediated.

mediated and

Our experience of God is mediated when, for example, we see

God's glory reflected in a glorious sunset, or in the starry heavens on a
clear, moonless night.

On the other hand, some experiences of God do not

involve perceptions of any sort.
contemplating him.

We sometimes experience God simply by

In either case, there seems to be "no experience of

God apart from the concept of God."3

But is it correct to assume that a

person without at least a minimal concept of God already in his
"repertoire" is capable of generating it in the extremity of selfknowledge?
However unlikely it seems, Roberts admits this as a possibility.
There is nothing particularly problematic in the suggestion that the

lIdem, Edifying Discourses, 2 vols., trans. David F. Swenson and
Lillian Marvin Swenson (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1962),
2:154.
2Ibid., p. 155
3Roberts, "The Socratic Knowledge of God," in International
Kierkegaard Commentary: The Concept of Anxiety, ed. Robert L. Perkins
(Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1985), p. 145.
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concept of "Providence" or of "the ground or source of absolutely binding
moral obligations" could arise spontaneously.
our ideas arise in this way.
clearest example.

After all, a great many of

Our idea of causation is perhaps the

When we experience a constant conjunction of two

events, we quite naturally think that they are connected by some sort of
cause

Though empiricists (like Hume) and rationalists (like Kant)

disagree over where this idea comes from and what its epistemic
credentials are, both admit that we have an ineluctable tendency to
believe in causation under such circumstances.

Similarly, when we see

other people behaving in the way we do in a wide variety of situations, we
cannot resist the idea that they exist, that they are like us and not
cleverly constructed robot duplicates of real people.

Kierkegaard is

saying something analogous about how the concept of God arises in the
extremity of self-knowledge.
Of course, Kierkegaard is not suggesting that a person could simply
sit down and use his imagination to invent "something a relationship with
which would satisfy his deepest emotional needs."1

Nor does he imply that

one could, solely on the basis of self-knowledge, come up with anything
like a fully developed theistic concept of God.

Admittedly, one who grows

up in Christendom, or Judaism, or "slam has an enormous advantage over one
who has no concept of God to start with.2

But there appears to be no

reason to think that such a deficit would preclude the concept of God
arising spontaneously in moments of self-transparent reflection.

1Roberts, "The Socratic Knowledge of God," p. 146.
2Ibid.
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Kierkegaard also maintains that one does not simply generate the
concept of God in the context of self-reflection; one experiences God's
presence.

This point is crucial for Kierkegaard.

But is it an

appropriate way of characterizing the natural knowledge of God?

Is it not

rather the case that, in the extremity of self-knowledge, "the individual
comes to realize his need for God (or for a God with certain
characteristics), and then postulates God as an object of belief which
satisfies this perceived need?"1

In defense of Kierkegaard, Roberts

considers both "the epistemic peculiarities of meeting God in experience,"
and "the similarity between the knowledge of God and other knowledge to
which we are pressed by 'psychological' exigency."2
In the Socratic realm, we encounter God as an object of
contemplation, and it is a part of the very concept of God that he is
present.

So to contemplate God is to contemplate a person in whose

presence we live.

Furthermore, "the compellingness in the psychological

situation of the extremity of self-knowledge is analogous to the
compellingness in the normal psychological situation of interaction with
other human beings."3

In a moment of intense conversation, it is nearly

impossible to be epistemically tentative about your interlocutor's
existence.

Similarly, "a person who is lucid about himself cannot be

tentative about the existence of God."4

The self-transparent individual

does not postulate God's existence; he stands in God's presence.

lIbid., pp. 144-5.
2Ibid., p. 147.
3Ibid., p. 149.
4Ibid.
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One of the interesting consequences of Kierkegaard's account of
natural religion is that belief in God will seem strenuous or difficult
only to the individual caught in the grip of a certain way of thinking
common among intellectual people.

He frequently parodies the person who

believes only what can be proven objectively.

How depressed this person

must feel "when he hears a naive and simple man talk about the existence
of God."

What this person lacks is precisely inwardness.

Kierkegaard

repeatedly stresses, however, that belief in God is (or should be) a
natural and proper outcome of personal growth --actualizing one's innate
potential to become a self.

In a footnote excised from one of his books

prior to publication, he even says that "there [has] never been an
atheist, even though there certainly have been many who have been
unwilling to let what they knew (that the God exists) get control over
their minds."2

Evans points out that this astonishing remark should not

be understood in the straightforward sense that everyone consciously
assents to God's existence.

Instead, one should read it the way one would

read the sort of claim a depth psychologist makes.

"Not everyone actually

knows God's reality, but everyone has the potentiality to do so, a
potentiality which the individual himself senses obscurely but can
willfully block."3
In addition, as Evans has argued, "it seems plausible that if there
were a God of the sort Christians and Jews believe in, and if knowing
about God were vital for human beings to attain fulfillment, the God would

1Kierkegaard [Vigilius Haufniensis]

The Concept of Anxiety, p. 140.

2Idem, Journals and Papers, 3:662.
3Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript", p. 151.
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make himself knowable in the sort of way .

. [Kierkegaard: sketches."1

One of the virtues of viewing belief in God as grounded in subjectivity or
inwardness is that it shifts the focus away from intellectual prowess and
places it on a person's capacity to express moral and religious passion
Human beings are on an equal footing with respect to their capacity for
inwardness.

Human equality is thus protected, and the knowledge of God is

not made to depend on a person's ability to follow abstruse philosophical
arguments.

Because every human being has an equal share in being human,

"the relationship to God is identical for all men."2
Finally, as I mentioned earlier, the natural knowledge of God lacks
much of the detail typically associated with a fully developed theistic
concept of God.

In the sphere of natural religion, the individual

encounters the eternality and infiniteness of God in the course of
becoming aware of "the eternal" and "the infinite" aspects of the self.
The self-aware individual also conceives of God as the ground or source of
the moral law.

As such, God is seen as benevolent and trustworthy.

As

the guarantor of "possibility," God is known to be personal --a being with
whom one is capable of interacting.

Though all of these elements are

consistent with traditional theism, they comprise only a small (albeit
significant) subset of the qualities theists typically attribute to God.
Of course, this is just what we should expect, given that Kierkegaard
thinks of natural religion (religiousness A) as a precondition for
religiousness B.

The natural knowledge of God is fulfilled or consummated

lIbid., p. 155.
2Kierkegaard [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, p. 204.
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in the "transcendent" sphere of "paradoxical" religion, namely
Christianity.
Summarily, on Kierkegaard's account of the structural or format
ive
elements of the natural religious life, the natural knowledge of
God
arises in the extremity of self-knowledge --the individual's awaren
ess of
the eternal, infinite, and possible aspects of the human "self."

In

discovering the truth about himself, the individual realizes
his affinity
with a transcendent reality.
encounter with God.

Kierkegaard construes this realization as an

In the next chapter, I explore two related

peculiarities in his treatment of religious belief:

his disdain for

inductive or probabilistic arguments ("proofs" of God's existe
nce), and
his insistence that the existence of God can nonetheless become
apparent
to a person with a unique kind of certainty, one grounded in
Kierkegaardian subjectivity.

CHAPTER III

CERTITUDE AND INWARDNESS

The natural knowledge of God is rooted in a person's self-knowlege.
The genuinely self-aware individual knows that God exists.
is thus a product of subjective reflection.

Belief in God

Kierkegaard detaches

religious belief from objective considerations--from "evidence" or
probabilistic arguments.

Indeed, he seems to think that such

considerations distract a person from the real ground of belief in God,
namely, one's capacity for inwardness or subjectivity.

In this chapter, I

argue that while Kierkegaard correctly rejects the attitude that belief in
God is rationally permissible only to the extent that it is supported by
objective considerations, he overstates his criticisms.

I suggest that

objective arguments can complement subjective concerns without thereby
becoming the basis of religious belief.

I also explore Kierkegaard's

analysis of the proper ground of the religious believer's certitude witn
respect to God's existence, which he links to his notion of inwardness or
subjectivity.

Finally, I juxtapose Kierkegaard's views on belief in God

with those of several contemporary philosophers of religion.

I conclude

that while Kierkegaared would undoubtedly reject the underlying
assumptions made by contemporary probabilistic theologians and
atheologians, he seems to agree with Alvin Plantinga on some basic issues
in the philosophy of religion.

Plantinga's "Reformed Epistemology"
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provides a helpful framework for understanding Kierkegaard's account of
belief in God as conditioned by an individual's capacity for inwardness

Certitude. Probability. and Inwardness
Vigilius Haufniensis observed of the nineteenth century that whereas
"in one direction truth increases in scope and quantity, and partly also
in abstract clarity, .
declines."

. in the opposite direction, certainty constantly

Ironically, as sincere and intelligent people produced "new,

exhaustive, and absolutely correct" proofs of immortality and the
existence of God (both truths essentially related to existence), their
reality seemed more in doubt than ever.

These clever people were in the

grip of the objective tendency--the tendency to approach every potential
object of knowledge as grist for the mill of objective reflection.

The

difficulty is that, from an objective standpoint, essential truth --that
is, moral and religious truth --is uncertain.

Interestingly enough,

Kierkegaard maintains that God's existence can nevertheless become clear
to a person "with a certainty of a very different order."2

In his

Journals, he compares the certainty one can have about the truth of
Christianity to that appropriate to the knowledge that God exists,
reminding himself that with respect to the former "I cannot ask for a
greater and different certainty than that which I have with respect to
assurance about the existence of God."3

Kierkegaard seems to think that

the quest for certitude is not misguided as such; but the attempt to base

1Kierkegaard [Vigilius Haufniensis], The Concept of Anxiety, p. 139.
2Idem, Edifying Discourses, 2:155.
3Idem, Journals and Papers, 1:107.
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it upon dispassionate, disinterested reflection is not only inappropriate,
but in Climacus's words, "a supreme theme for crazy comedy."1
What does Kierkegaard think is the ground or basis of this unique
assurance available to existing individuals with regard to God's reality'
To begin with, it is clearly not grounded in knowledge derived from the
external senses.

When we believe that our senses are working properly in

an appropriate environment--that is, an environment for which they were
designed--we are typically quite certain of the reality of what we
encounter in sense experience.

"Is it possible," asks Kierkegaard, "to

have empirical certitude of a relationship to God?"

The question is

rhetorical, because God is a spirit, and "it is impossible to have a
relationship [with a spiritual being] other than a spiritual
relationship."2

He repeats the same point in On Authority and Revelation.

There he states that "it is nonsense to get sensible certitude of the fact
that God exists, since God indeed is spirit."3

The unique object of

religious knowledge precludes the possibility of "sensible certitude."
Kierkegaard is equally clear that certitude about the existence of
God cannot be based on objective arguments or proofs.
essential truths in general, proofs are never decisive.

With regard to
In ethical and

religious contexts, proofs "approximate" the truth:
The existing individual who chooses the objective way enters upon the

lIdem [Johannes Climacusl

Fragments, p. 43.

2Tdem, Journals and Papers, 1:107.
3Idem, On Authority and
Revelation, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 109.
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entire approximation-process by which it is proposed to bring God to
light objectively.I
But this project cannot succeed, "because God is a subject t that is, a
person], and therefore exists only for subjectivity in inwardness."2
Again, the peculiar relationship between the knower and the thing known is
such that certitude cannot be grounded in objective arguments.
Kierkegaard's disdain for proofs of God's existence is well known,
and should be considered in light of his defense of the possibility of a
direct or intuitive awareness of God.

"The idea of proving the existence

of God," he writes in his Journals, "is of all things the most
ridiculous."

Either God exists, or he does not exist.

"then one cannot prove it .
human being exists."
proved at all."3

If God exists,

. [any more] than I can prove that a certain

If God does not exist, then of course "it cannot be

His contempt for proofs as a source of the knowledge of

God is rooted to a large extent in his conviction that we do not in fact
know God in this way.

The knowledge of God is far more immediate than the

knowledge that results from objective reflection.

Knowledge of the latter

sort is "mediated," or inferential.

With regard to the existence of God,

no proof is epistemically fruitful.

Properly speaking, we do not "infer"

God's existence.
contemplation.

Rather, we encounter God as an immediate object of
Belief in GIci is thus grounded in an individual's

experience of God.

Kierkegaar,l's concept of knowledge (at least in so far

as it pertains to the knowledge of God) is one of knowledge by

lIdem [Johannes Climacusl, Postscript, p. 178.
2Ibid.
3Idem, Journals and Papers, 2:93
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acquaintance --direct personal "involvement with and participation in the
truth."1
Far from removing doubts, Kierkegaard thinks that the proofs actually
generate doubts.

Ironically, the more reasons the doubter adduces for the

existence of God, the stronger his doubts become.
To present doubt with reasons with the intent of slaying it is like
giving to a hungry monster one wants to be rid of the delicious food
it likes best.2
Besides playing into the hands of the atheist or agnostic, giving an
argument for God's existence is (at least for the believer) tantamount to
blasphemy.

God is present, and

to prove the existence of one who is present is the most shameless
affront, since it is an attempt to make him ridiculous; but
unfortunately people have no inkling of this and for sheer
seriousness regard it as a pious undertaking. But how could it occur
to anybody to prove that he exists, unless one had permitted himself
to ignore him.i
To try to prove God's existence is to assume that an argument is needed to
recognize a truth that is, as it were, "right before one's nose."4
Kierkegaard also seems to think that there is something misleading
(and possibly even deceptive) about offering proofs for God's existence.
And how does the existence of the god emerge from the demonstration?
Does it happen straightaway? Is it not here as it is with the
Cartesian dolls? As soon as I let go of the doll, it stands on its
head. As soon as I let go of it--consequently, I have to let go of
it. So also with the demonstration--so long as I am holding on to
the demonstration (that is, continue to be one who is demonstrating),

lEvans, "Kierkegaard's Attack on Apologetics," Christian Scholar's
Review 10 (1981): 324.
2Kierkegaard, For Self Examination and Judge for Yourselves!, p. 88.
3Idem (Johannes Climacus]

Postscript, p. 485.

4Evans, "Kierkegaard and Plantinga on Belief in God," Faith and
Philosophx 5 (January 1988): 27.
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the existence does not emerge, if for no other reason than that I am
in the process of demonstrating it, but when I let go of the
demonstration, the existence is there.'
The interesting point of this passage is that God's existence can be
known, but not by proof.

The proof is even a hindrance.

As soon as it is

set aside, "the existence is there."
Evans suggests that what lies behind this passage is Kierkegaard's
view of logical argument.

The result of a demonstration is never the

existence of something, but merely "the consequences of a concept,"2 in
ether words, "what propositions are entailed by, consistent with, or
inconsistent with other propositions."3

So the process of demonstration

"becomes an expanded concluding development of what I conclude from having
presupposed that the object of the investigation exists."4

A person's

acceptance of the conclusion of a logical argument depends on his prior
acceptance of the truth of its premises.

But the latter is not ultimately

a matter of logic, "since if premises cannot be known in some way other
than by logical arguments, no logical arguments can be known to be
sound."5

Consequently, even if there are sound arguments for God's

existence,
. . . the individual's acceptance of the conclusion is still not
ultimately a function of the argument, but of something else, which

1Kierkegaard [Johannes Climacus], Fragments, p. 42-3.
2Ibid., p. 40, translated in Evans
"Postscript", p. 150.

Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and

3Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript", p. 150.
4Kierkegaard [Johannes Climacus], Fragments, p. 40.
5Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript", p. 150.
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does not consist of logical argument, that something else being the
way one knows the premises of the argument to be true.1
For the existence of God to emerge, the individual must "let go of the
demonstration", that is, admit that his acceptance of the conclusion is
rooted in something more than the demonstration alone.

Climacus calls

this additional element --"this letting go"--a "leap" to emphasize that
apart from a subjective contribution, proofs never establish the existence
of anything.

"Therefore," he explains, "whether I am moving in the world

of sensate palpability or in the world of thought, I never reason in
conclusion to existence, but I reason in conclusion from existence."2
I believe that Kierkegaard has overstated his attack on theistic
arguments.

To begin with, it is unfair to suppose (as Kierkegaard seems

to) that all (or even most) apologists merely pretend to give arguments,
concealing the real grounds of their belief, when in fact what they do is
presuppose God's existence from the outset.

Kierkegaard is probably also

mistaken in his supposition that everyone who offers arguments for God's
existence assumes that their premises can be known to be true by anyone in
an entirely disinterested fashion, though some philosophers of religion
indeed think that a really good argument requires premises of this sort.
For example, Richard Swinburne defines a "good" inductive (nondemonstrative) argument as one whose premises are "known to be true by
those who dispute about the conclusion."3
arguments of this sort for God's existence.

It may be that there are no
When confronted with a valid

lIbid.
2Kierkegaard [Johannes Climacus]

Fragments, p. 40.

3Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1979), pp. 7-8.
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argument for God's existence from premises he knows to be true, the
atheist might choose to give up one or more of the premises rather than
admit the conclusion.
In addition to obscuring the possibility of open and evenhanded
apologetics, Kierkegaard's repudiation of proofs as a basis for
existential claims casts a shadow over a legitimate, if less ambitious
purpose for theistic arguments

In cases of genuine doubt, theistic

arguments can help clear away specific obstacles to belief in God.
Kierkegaard seems to think that every instance of doubt is willful,
spiritual insubordination.

Though it may be that most of the doubts

people have about God's existence are of this sort, it is by no means
obvious that honest, intellectual doubt is nonexistent.

Theistic

arguments can help resolve such doubts (however rare) without thereby
becoming the basis of the individual's belief in God.
Kierkegaard's bid to counter his contemporaries' reliance on
objective reflection to the utter neglect of subjective considerations
seems to have clouded an appreciation for theistic arguments that he might
otherwise have admitted.

His dismissal of objective, speculative

knowledge is engineered to highlight his claim that God can be known as an
object of subjective reflection.

Evans ably sums up Kierkegaard's scorn

for proofs:
The proofs throw dust in your eyes and while you are blinking take
from your hands a method of knowing which can give you real bread,
and substitute a method of knowing which can only give you stones. 1
Briefly stated, Kierkegaard's basic complaint seems to be that in
constructing proofs we exchange the certain for the uncertain--"we give up

lEvans, "Kierkegaard's Attack on Apologetics," p. 325.
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the most certain of all things for the various alluring tasks of
approximation knowledge."1
In the Postscript, Climacus credits Socrates with recognizing the
dangers here.
When Socrates believed that there
where the way swings off there is
approximation, for example by the
history, and so forth. His merit
where the quantitative siren song
existing individual.2

was a God, he saw very well that
also an objective way of
contemplation of nature and human
was precisely to shun this way,
enchants the mind and deceives the

Climacus is thinking of objective arguments as attempts to show that God's
existence is probable.

By constructing probabilistic arguments (the

"objective way of approximation"), the individual hopes to negotiate the
objective uncertainty of God's existence.
attitude "shrewdness."

Kierkegaard often calls this

The shrewd individual misuses deliberation as a

ploy to avoid decisive action.

"In general," marvels Climacus, "it is

quite inconceivable how ingenious and inventive human beings can be in
evading an ultimate commitment."3

In The Concept of Anxiety, Haufniensis

equates unbelief and the mockery of religion with a "lack of certitude"
rather than, as one might expect, a "lack of content."

Lack of certitude

is linked, not with a failure of the understanding, but with a state of
anxiety about the content of what one already knows.4

This anxiety

expresses itself directly or indirectly in various ways:

"as mockery, as

prosaic intoxication with common sense, as busyness, as enthusiasm for the

1Kierkegaard [Johannes Climacus)

Postscript, p. 137.

2Ibid., p. 188-9.
3Ibid., p. 379.
4Idem [Vigilius Haufniensis], The Concept of Anxiety, p. 139.

temporal," and so on.'

Instead of making a commitment, the individual

becomes anxious, "and anxiety can contrive a hundred evasions."2
Most of the time, Kierkegaard uses "belief" to refer to something
more than intellectual assent.

In his Journals, he says that the

existence of God "cannot be 'proved'--it must be believed."3
idea is developed in several places by Climacus.

The same

For example, in the

Postscript he claims that it is impossible to believe what is probable.
Suppose that a man wishes to believe something important about his
existence (such as that God exists, or that "the eternal truth has come
into being in time"), but "wishes also to safeguard himself by means of an
objective inquiry and its approximation-process."4

Suppose further that

he is able to render the belief candidate highly probable with respect to
the objective evidence.
Now he is ready to believe it, and he ventures to claim for himself
that he does not believe as shoemakers and tailors and simple folk
believe, but only after long deliberation. Now he is ready to
believe it; and lo, now it has become precisely impossible to believe
it. Anything that is almost probable, or probable, or extremely and
emphatically probable, is something he can almost know--but it is
impossible to believe.5
In this passage, "belief" connotes unreserved commitment, which Climacus
thinks is prevented if belief is based on probabilistic arguments.
1Ibid., p. 152.
2Ibid., p. 154.
3Idem

Journals and Papers, 2:155.

4Idem [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, p. 189.
5Ibid.

As
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Kierkegaard remarks elsewhere, "religiously considered, the man who never
let go of probability never committed himself to God."1
In the Fragments, Climacus defines belief as "an act of freedom, an
expression of will."2
statement is false.

As a straightforward claim about belief, this

In many situations, we cannot simply decide what to

believe or what not to believe, as though granting or withholding assent
were subject to our direct control.

The context, however, makes it clear

that a straightforward voluntarist reading of this passage is incorrect.
Climacus is discussing the objective uncertainty of beliefs about what has
"come into existence"--matters of fact such as "the world has existed
longer than five minutes," or "other people exist."

He has in mind the

Greek sceptics who doubted "not by virtue of knowledge but by virtue of
will."3

To explain the fact that people commonly commit themselves (or

find themselves committed to) beliefs that are objectively uncertain,
Climacus suggests that "doubt can only be terminated in freedom, by an act
of the will."4

Belief and doubt are thus "opposite passions."

Of course,

not every instance ot doubt is traceable to a willful reluctance to assent
to an objective uncertainty.

At least some of the time we lack (or think

that we lack) the relevant data or experience upon which to base a
decision.

The point of the contrast here between belief and doubt is that

sometimes the best way to be sure about something is to resolve to believe

lidera, For Self Examination and Judge for Yourselves!, p. 116.
2Idem [Johannes Climacus], Fragments, p. 83.
3Ibid., p. 82.
4Ibid.
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it.

Moreover, we are personally responsible for both what we believe and,

just as importantly, what we choose not to believe.
In a footnote, Climacus explains that belief always involves an
element of risk.

Wanting to avoid risk is like wanting "to know with

certainty that one can swim before going into the water."'
calls this attitude "prudence."

Kierkegaard

He sees prudence as "an excuse to avoid

the venture and its strenuosity."2

A venture is "the precise correlative

of an [objective] uncertainty."3
If I am in truth resolved to venture, in truth resolved to strive for
the attainment of the highest good [an eternal happiness], the
uncertainty must be there, and I must have room to move, so to speak.
But the largest space I can obtain, where there is room for the most
vehement gesture of the passion that embraces the infinite, is
uncertainty of knowledge with respect to an eternal happiness, or the
certain knowledge that the choice is . . . [from an objective
standpoint] a piece of madness: now there is room to move, now you
can venture!4
Human existence is thus "an enthusiastic venture in uncertainty "5
Moreover,
when one lets go of probability in order to venture in reliance upon
God, one has to acknowledge to oneself what is implied in this
letting go of probability, namely, that when one thus ventures, it is
just exactly as possible that one will be victorious as that one will
be defeated.6
There are no guarantees of objective certainty with respect to the most
important questions of life.

The existing individual must venture, he

lIbid., p. 83.
2Idem [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, p. 381.
3Ibid., p. 380
4Ibid., p. 381.
SIbid., p. 355.
6Tdem, For Self Examination and Judge for Yourselves!

p. 117.
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must believe.

The person who ventures "in reliance upon God" understands

something about the one on whom he is depending, namely that God is
reliable.

Therefore he does not venture "blindly."

To rely upon

calculations of probability is to rely upon oneself rather than God.
Kierkegaard is reminding us that this is not an appropriate posture for
the religious person to adopt.
Kierkegaard maintains that "without risk there is no faith."

Faith

is the correlate of truth viewed as "an ob ective uncertainty held fast in
an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness."

This, he

suggests, is "the highest truth attainable for an existing individual."1
Moral and religious truth is grasped with certainty through concerned
existence, not detached, speculative inquiry.

As Climacus puts it, "If I

am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely
because I cannot do this I must believe."2
We are now in a position to see clearly what constitutes the ground
of certitude with regard to essential truth for the existing individual.
Certitude must be understood "in an entirely concrete sense."
can be attained "only by and in action."3

That is, it

The ground of certainty, like

the solution to certain doubts, lies not in reflection, but in resolution.
God's reality can be grasped with certainty through personal commitment,
not abstract thought.

The only "proof" possible for the existence of "the

absolute ethical good" (immortality) is "the individual himself expressing

lIbid., p. 182.
2Ibid.
3Idem [Vigilius Haufniensis], The Concept of \nxiety, p. 138.
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it existentially in existence."1

Likewise, "one proves [God's] presence

by an expression of submission, which may assume various forms according
to the customs of the country--and thus one proves God's existence by
worship . . . not by proofs."2

Kierkegaard is not suggesting that worship

constitutes anything like a logical argument for the existence of God.
Rather, worship is an outward indicator of God's reality.

Also, it is not

that what was once an objective uncertainty suddenly becomes an objective
certainty.

The objective uncertainty cannot be negotiated.

Rather, the

believer apprehends God's reality with a unique and different certainty, a
certainty grounded in the individual's subjectivity.

Kierkegaard thus

places "personal commitments—subjectivity in a Kierkegaardian sense --into
the heart of the knowing process."3

Probabilistic Theology and Atheology
Kierkegaard's approach to belief in God contrasts sharply with that
of contemporary probabilistic theologians like Richard Swinburne and Basil
Mitchell, and probabilistic atheologians like John Mackie.

These

philosophers presuppose that belief in God (in so far as it is rational)
is properly the result of an argument, and that it rests on a cumulative
body of objective evidence.

They reflect precisely the attitude toward

religious belief that Kierkegaard so vehemently denounces in his writings,
and therefore provide an illuminating contrast to his point of view.

lidera [Johannes Climacus), Postscript, p. 379.
2Ibid., p. 485.
3Evans, "Kierkegaard and Plantinga on Belief in God," p. 31.
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Swinburne thinks that human beings have a moral obligation to hold
true beliefs about religious matters.

"The primary obligation on a man is

to pursue religious inquiry with diligence, and to hold whatever religious
belief that inquiry suggests."1

The best way to fulfill this obligation

(indeed the only way), he thinks, is to hold rational beliefs.

A belief

is rational for Swinburne if it is likely to be true for what he calls
"epistemological reasons."

The reasons he takes to be epistemologically

relevant to rationality are based on objective considerations.

Beliefs

fail to be rational when they are "based on evidence in the wrong way," or
"based on the wrong sort of evidence."

In either case, evidence is

essential to rational belief.
By "evidence" Swinburne means a person's "basic propositions"
together with his initial degree of confidence in them.

Basic

propositions are propositions that are either (a) given in immediate
experience, or (b) such that they strike a person as true on the basis of
reason (i.e., analytic truths).

As he sees it, a person starts with

evidence--"basic propositions which seem . . . to report experience or
merely be intuitively right .

."

These basic propositions "interact

to give rise to other beliefs which men believe to be rendered probable by
the evidence."2

So according to Swinburne, a person believes a

proposition p "if and only if

. . . [he) believes that the total

1-Swinburne, Faith and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1981),
102
2Ibid., p. 44.
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evidential situation available to him makes p more probable than any
alternative."
Swinburne calls an argument whose premises make the conclusion
probable a "correct P-inductive argument."

In an age of religious

scepticism, however, what interests people "are arguments to the existence
(or non-existence) of God in which the premises are known to be true by
men of all theistic or atheistic persuasions."2

He therefore defines a

"good P-inductive argument" as any argument "from premises known to be
true by those who dispute about the conclusion."3

The basic idea, then,

is that there is some body of evidence (the intersection of what we all
know) such that on it, theism is to be judged more probable or improbable
than any alternative.
by John Mackie.

Swinburne's approach to theistic belief is shared

In his book, The Miracle of Theism. Mackie states that

"after we have taken several different non-deductive arguments for and
against the existence of a god and examined them separately, we must also
consider their cumulative effect and decide what conclusion is the better
supported by the evidence as a whole."4
At the end of his inquiry, Swinburne draws the following conclusion:
On our total evidence theism is more probable than not. An argument
from all the evidence considered in this book to the existence of God
is a good P-inductive argument.5

lIbid., p. 19.
2Idem, The Existence of God, p. 7.
3Ibid.
4John Mackie, The Miracle of Theism
1982), p. 7.

Oxford

5Swinburne, The Existence
of God, p. 291

Oxford University Press
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Mackie, on the other hand, draws the opposite conclusion:
In the end, therefore, we can agree with what Laplace said about God:
we have no need of that hypothesis. . . . The balance of
probabilities
. . comes out strongly against the existence of a
god.1
Though they disagree over which proposal the evidence supports (theism or
atheism), Swinburne and Mackie are both thinking of theism as a hypothesis
--a "large-scale theory of the universe" offered to explain some body of
evidence.

Swinburne himself draws attention to the fact that his

application of confirmation theory exploits "the close similarities which
exist between religious theories and large-scale scientific theories."2
Regarding an argument from religious experience, Mackie claims that "here,
as elsewhere, the supernaturalist hypothesis fails because there is an
adequate and much more economical naturalistic alternative."3
Even Basil Mitchell's more sober account of religious belief reflects
the assumption that theism is relevantly like a scientific hypothesis.
Mitchell concedes that "it is not possible to prove traditional Christian
theism or to render it probable in any strict sense of the word."4

He

therefore thinks that the case for the reasonableness of theism must be
"cumulative."

Accordingly,

what has been taken as a series of failures when treated as attempts
at purely deductive or inductive arguments could well be better
understood as contributions to a cumulative case. On this view the
theist is urging that traditional Christian theism makes better sense

1 1ackie, p. 253.
2Swinburne, The Existence of God, p• 3.
3Mackie, p. 198.
4Basil Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Belief (Oxford: The
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1973; reissued New York: Oxford University Press,
1981), p. 39.
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of all the evidence available than does any alternative on offer, and
the atheist is contesting the claim. The dispute concerns what
Gilbert Ryle calls 'the plausibility of theories' rather than proof
or probability in any strict sense.'
Though he recognizes that for an argument to be rational it need not
conform to the requirements of proof or strict probability, he
nevertheless accepts that the rationality of belief in God depends in an
informal way on the explanatory power of theism.2
Kierkegaard would certainly reject the assumption that belief in God
is rationally permissible only to the extent that it provides a good
explanation of some body of evidence.

To construe theism in terms of a

scientific hypothesis is a symptom of the "objective tendency."

More

importantly, to base belief in God on probabilistic reasoning is to
forsake the subjective way of knowing, conditioned by an individual's
capacity for inwardness, and replace it with "the objective way of
approximation."
Swinburne acknowledges that, as far as he is concerned, the most that
anyone can do to insure that their beliefs are true is to have what he
calls rational5 beliefs.

An individual S has a rational5 belief "if and

only if S's evidence results from past investigation which was adequate
and inductive standards which have been submitted to adequate criticism,
and S has investigated adequately whether his evidence makes his belief
probable."3

(A person's "inductive standards" are the beliefs he holds

lIbid., pp. 39-40.
2A theory's explanatory power is, borrowing Swinburne's definition,
the extent to which "it entails or makes probable the occurrence of many
diverse phenomena which are all observed to occur, and the occurrence of
which is not otherwise to be expected." The Existence of God, p. 53.
3Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 54.
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about "what makes what probable."

These may or may not be explicit, but

nevertheless govern the weighing of evidence and assigning of
probabilities.)

As he puts it,

Only by acquiring more evidence which is true, representative, and
relevant, by checking my inductive standards and what they show
(and
not suppressing evidence or distorting inductive standards), can I
turn my belief into one which really has a high degree of probability
on all my evidence. And ensuring that I have a very probable belief
is all that I can do towards ensuring that I have a true belief—for
a very probable belief is one which is, very probably, true.'
(Italics mine.)
To find out whether theism is true, according to Swinburne, the best
(indeed the only) strategy to adopt is to consider the evidence.
Kierkegaard emphatically denies that objective reflection is the only
pathway to truth for human beings.

Indeed, with respect to essential

truth (the truth that is essential for a person to possess--moral and
religious truth), the appropriate way to find out what is true is to
engage in subjective

flection, a way of knowing that involves the whole

person, not just his intellect.
Swinburne and Mackie (and, to a lesser extent, Mitchell) are
captivated by an ideal of rationality whose origin dates back at least
as
far as John Locke.2

According to the Lockean ideal, the best way to

insure the greatest number of true beliefs in the long run is to follow
the dictates of reason.

The only mediate beliefs that we are permitted to

hold are those which upon careful sifting of the total evidence we
see to
lIhid.

p. 72.

2ror my understanding of Locke, I lean heavily on Nicholas
Wolterstorff, from whose graduate seminar at the University of
Notre Dame
(Spring 1987) I draw upon here. See also his "Migration of Theist
ic
Arguments," in Rationality. Religious Belief. and Moral Commitment,
ed.
Robert Audi and William J. Wainwright (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1986), pp. 38-81.
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be either entailed by that evidence or probable with respect to that
evidence.

Locke was perhaps the first to articulately issue the

evidentialist challenge to the religious believer.

Locke's ideal of

rationality rests on a classical foundationalist theory of knowledge,
according to which the only basic propositions a person is permitted to
hold are those that are either incorrigible or self-evident.

Since the

proposition "God exists" is neither incorrigible nor self-evident, the
rational permissibility of belief in God depends entirely on its
evidential moorings.
Swinburne, Mackie, and Mitchell each presuppose evidentialism,
according to which theistic belief requires evidence.1
clearly rejects evidentialism.
God.

Kierkegaard

Evidence is not essential to belief in

Furthermore, attending to evidence actually distracts a person's

attention away from the proper way to know God, namely, by cultivating
inwardness.

Probabilistic theologians and atheologians also tend to

assume that it is not possible for a human being to believe in God with
certainty (a probability of one).

Swinburne admits that "although reason

can reach a fairly well justified conclusion about the existence of God,
it can only reach a probable conclusion, not an indubitable one."2
Kierkegaard is aware that belief in God cannot be certain in anything like
a classical foundationalist sense (that is, by being incorrigible, selfevident, or evident to the senses).

But, as we have seen, it can

lUnlike Locke, however, they do not embrace classical
foundationalism, at least not explicitly.
2Swinburne, The Existence of God, p. 2.
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nevertheless be certain in a different way, a way grounded in an
individual's subjectivity.

Kierkegaard and "Reformed Epistemology"
Kierkegaard's views on belief in God agree in important respects with
those of another, twentieth century critic of probabilistic theology and
atheology, Alvin Plantinga.

Plantinga also thinks that the arguments of

probabilistic theologians (like Swinburne) and atheologians (like Mackie)
are relevant only if we think of belief in God as or as like a sort of
scientific hypothesis.

But why do that?

"Perhaps," he suggests, "it is

perfectly rational to take belief in God in the way we ordinarily take
belief in other minds, material objects, and the like.
perfectly sensible to start with belief in God?"1

Why isn't it

In other words, why

can't belief in God be "properly basic" for the theist?
In "Reason and Belief in God," Plantinga introduces the idea of a
"noetic structure."

A person's noetic structure is "the set of

propositions he believes, together with certain epistemic relations that
hold between him and these propositions."2

Some beliefs are such that a

person believes them, but not on the basis of any other beliefs he holds.
These beliefs comprise the foundation of a person's noetic structure.

If

it is rational for a person to hold a given belief in this manner, then
that belief is properly basic for that individual.

So Plantinga's claim

that belief in God can be properly basic amounts to the claim that it can

lAlvin Plantinga, "Is Theism Really a Miracle?" Faith and Philosophy
3 (April 1986), p. 133.
2Idem, "Reason and Belief in God," in Faith and Rationality, ed.
Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame
Press, 1983), p. 48.
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be rational for the theist to include belief in God in the foundation of
his noetic structure.
According to Plantinga and "Reformed Epistemologists" then, "certain
beliefs are properly basic in certain circumstances; [and] those same
beliefs may not be properly basic in other circumstances."

In addition,

"there are widely recognized circumstances in which belief in God is
properly basic."1

Plantinga goes out of his way to emphasize that it does

not follow from the claim that belief in God can be properly basic that it
is groundless.

A belief is properly basic only in certain conditions:

These conditions are, we might say, the ground of its justification
and, by extension, the ground of the belief itself. In this sense A
basic beliefs are not, or are not necessarily groundless beliefs.'
These "justification-conferring conditions" confer prima facie rather than
ultima facie, or all things considered justification on properly basic
beliefs.

Thus, having a characteristic sort of experience plays an

important role in both the formation of some basic beliefs, and their
justification.
There are, Plantinga maintains, "many conditions and circumstances
that call forth belief in God," including "guilt, gratitude, danger, a
sense of God's presence, as sense that he speaks, [and] perception of
various parts of the universe."

A complete job, he thinks, "would explore

the phenomenology of all these conditions and of more besides."3
regard, Kierkegaard contributes to Plantinga's case.

In this

Kierkegaard's

phenomenology of the formative or structural elements of natural religion,
1Ibid., p. 74.
2Ibid., p. 80.
3Ibid., p. 81.
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in which belief in God is conditioned by inwardness, responds to
Plantinga's call for a fuller phenomenology of the various "justification conferring conditions" that constitute the ground of belief in God.

An

individual's awareness of the eternal, infinite, and possible aspects of
the self in the extremity of self-knowledge gives rise to belief in God.
Self-awareness (of a specific sort) can be a "justification-conferring
condition" in Plantinga's sense.

Kierkegaardian subjectivity can be, in

Plantinga's terms, the ground of a properly basic belief in God.
recent article, Evans makes the same comparison.

In a

He agrees that

"Kierkegaard's view of inwardness or subjectivity as conditioning the
knowledge of God provides an illuminating way of fleshing out Plantinga's
suggestion that belief in God, though not based on arguments or evidence,
is nonetheless grounded and in some sense justified."1
Though they seem to agree that objective or propositional evidence is
not essential to belief in God, Plantinga does not share Kierkegaard's
expressed contempt for theistic arguments.

Although the mature theist's

belief in God is not (or, at any rate, should not be) based on theistic
arguments, they can nonetheless serve to bolster and confirm belief in
God.

He no longer thinks that good arguments are only those whose

premises a person is obliged to accept on pain of irrationality.
doubts that any arguments are coercive in that sense.

He

Arguments for God's

existence do not, properly speaking, give rise to belief in God.
Plantinga nonetheless affirms that they provide the theist (and others)
with helpful clues about how to think about various questions from a
theistic perspective.

For example, with respect to the question "Why is

'Evans, "Kierkegaard and Plantinga on Belief in God," p. 37.
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there something instead of nothing?" the familiar cosmological argument
suggests that, from a theistic point of view, the cosmos depends upon God
for its creation and continued existence.

In a similar way, "moral"

arguments for God's existence suggest that the best way for the theist to
understand morality is to think of it as emanating from God.

This

approach to theistic arguments is discernable in Kierkegaard's Fragments.
As I have already mentioned, in the course of denying that proofs
demonstrate that something exists, Climacus remarks that what they really
do is develop "the consequences of a concept."

Unfortunately,

Kierkegaard's denial that they can serve as anything like a basis for
belief in the existence of God seems for him to have included the
abrogation of even such a limited role for theistic arguments in religious
belief.

Concluding Summary
Kierkegaard has nonetheless underscored something important about
human knowledge.

At least in some areas, knowing involves more than

detached, objective inquiry.
the deliverances of reason.

Knowledge and certainty are not confined to
To ascertain the truth that is essential for

human existence (moral and religious truth), Kierkegaard prescribes a
method of reflection rooted in the individual's subjectivity--his
"emotional cosmos of convictions, wishes, hopes, and feelings, his entire
range of inward sensibility."1

With regard to essential truth, the

conditions of certitude are moral and spiritual, not intellectual (at
least not entirely).

1Paul Holmer, Introduction to Edifying Discourses: A Selection,
Soren Kierkegaard (New York: Harper and Row), pp. xv-xvi.
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The natural knowledge of God (which includes belief in the existence
of God) is an instancn of the subjective way of knowing, conditioned by an
individual's capacity for inwardness.

In the extremity of self-knowledge,

the individual discovers the eternal, the infinite, and the possible,
thereby realizing his affinity with and dependence on God.

Kierkegaard

construes this realization as an encounter with God, the awakening of a
God-relationship.

His attack on speculative philosophers' attempts to

make God an object of objective reflection tends to cast these two ways of
knowing in opposition to one another,

His remedy for an overdose of

objectivity concerning life's most important questions (such as personal
immortality and the existence of God) thus cbscures the legitimate (albeit
limited) place for objective considerations in an individual's quest for
the truth with regard to these issues.

Properly understood, however,

subjectivity and objectivity are not alternatives.

Rather, they are

complementary modes of approaching existential problems

For the

religious believer, objective arguments augment subjective considerations.
They can therefore buttress the reasonableness of theism, without thereby
becoming (as Kierkegaard seemed to think they must) the ground of belief
in God for an existing person.

This way of thinking about objective

arguments is not, I think, inconsistent with Kierkegaard's emphasis on the
decisiveness of subjectivity with regard to essential truth.
Kierkegaard's writings constitute an elaborate corrective for a
certain attitude toward truth claims, an attitude as prevalent today as it
was in mid-nineteenth century Denmark.
difficult to resist.

The objective tendency is

Yet Kierkegaard attempted to do so, pointing out to

his contemporaries (and us) that "the ethical and the ethico-religious are
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so very easy to understand, but on the other hand so difficult to do."1
Though he recognized "the imperative of understanding," he also realized
the supreme importance of appropriation, of finding "a truth which is true
for me."

"This," he wrote in his Journals at the age of twenty-two,

is what I needed to lead a completely human life and not merely one
of knowledge, so that I could base the development of my thought on -yes, not on something called objective--something which in any case
is not my own, but upon something which is bound up with the deepest
roots of my existence, through which I am, so to speak, grafted into
the divine, to which I cling fast even though the whole world may
collapse. This is what I need, and this is what I strive for.2
He exposed the intellectual hubris of his age, and to this day reminds his
readers that the truth cannot merely be grasped by the reason, it must
also be lived.

1Kierkegaard [Johannes Climacus], Postscript, p. 417.
2Idem, Journals and Papers, 5:35.
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